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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A stock-flow consistent model is a macrodynamic model based on national 
income and product accounts and flow of funds accounts.  Godley and Lavoie (2007) 
introduce a promising approach to modeling and analyzing national income and 
product accounts and flow of funds accounts, emphasizing the dynamic interaction 
between price formation and functional income distribution.  Godley and Lavoie’s 
models are set up in such a way as to facilitate the construction of behavioral macro 
models in the tradition of Keynes (1936) and Kalecki (1971).  Such model building 
results in aggregate dynamics that can be described as business cycles, that is, the 
models replicate observed empirical regularities.   
The extended stock-flow accounting scheme underpinning any aggregate 
dynamics simulated in this thesis will summarize the transactions taking place within 
a realistic and modern financial sector that contains securities and financial facilities.  
This thesis will also provide some insight into the dynamics of aggregate behavior by 
means of numerical simulations, suggesting interesting closures grounded in Godley 
and Lavoie (2007). 
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Godley and Lavoie divide the economy into five sectors: firms, households, 
government, the central bank, and private banks1. These sectors are designed in such 
a way that the income inflows to one sector are outflows from other sectors.  The 
same is true for financial transactions.  These flows, when they accumulate over time, 
as they must in a dynamic context, become stocks; thus, the models are stock flow 
consistent. 
Price formation, income distribution, and business cycles play an important 
role in Keynes-Kalecki type monetary economic modeling, via the treatment of 
inventories and interest costs.  Price formation depends mainly upon factor shares—
or functional income distribution—and the real interest rate.  Combining alternative 
possibilities of interaction among these variables results in a behavioral 
macroeconomic model that can be analyzed computationally, even when strict 
analytical techniques may fail2. 
The aim of this thesis is to use the stock flow consistent approach to study and 
analyze some phenomena that could be involved in, or affected by, the recent global 
financial crisis.  This thesis makes several contributions. Firstly, I am going to study 
how house price variations affect both the real and the financial sides of the economy.  
The recent financial crisis is leading the economics profession to re-evaluate the role 
of financial integration and globalization in the spread of the crisis. In my thesis, I am 
going to study financial integration and see its effects on the integrated economies.  
Finally, I am going to explore the impact of credit crunch and its contagion on both 
                                                          
1
 Most of Godley and Lavoie’s models are simulated for a closed economy, and some for open 
economies.   
2
 Of course, strictly speaking, any system of linear equations is solvable, however, in the case of very 
large sets of simultaneous equations, choices of initial conditions, as well as solution algorithms (for 
example, Gauss-Seidel) become important to reach any numerical solution, as we shall see in the pages 
of this thesis.  
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domestic and foreign economies, which is clearly relevant to the current international 
economy in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
1.1 THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
1.1.1 PART ONE (CHAPTER THREE)  
This part of my thesis deals with the impact of house price variations on the 
economy.  In this model I am simulating a one-time increase in the expected house 
prices using a stock flow consistent monetary model grounded in Godley and Lavoie 
and building on the work of Zezza (2007) and (2008).  The importance of modeling 
house prices is to show the short and long term impacts on the whole economy.  The 
recent US house price bubble is considered one of the main reasons behind the recent 
financial crisis.  Modeling these phenomena is necessary for developing proper fiscal 
and monetary policies to prevent crises from happening in the future. 
The model describes a closed economy with five sectors: households, firms 
(non-financial sector), government, central bank, and private banks.  Each sector is 
assumed to acquire assets (+) and have liabilities (-).  
The model is simulated for 51 periods for each scenario.  The first scenario 
assumes a one-time increase in the expected house prices.  This assumption leads the 
economy to fluctuate at the beginning before it return to its previous level.  The 
second scenario assumes that the government increases its expenditure to stimulate 
the economy as a fiscal policy tool in its hands. The third scenario assumes a decline 
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in the advances interest rate as a monetary policy taken by the central bank in order 
to stimulate the economy. 
These scenarios are implemented to explore the effect of house prices 
variations on the different facets of the economy: production, investment, 
consumption, distribution of income and wealth.  The goal is to investigate the effects 
of fiscal and monetary policies on the economy, to understand how these policies can 
stimulate production. 
The results of these simulations show that the increase in house prices leads to 
an increase in the main economic indicators such as output, consumption, disposable 
income in the short-run, but later leads to a decline in these indicators.  The proposed 
fiscal and monetary policies may play an important role in stimulating the economy. 
1.1.2 PART TWO (CHAPTER FOUR) 
The second part of my thesis aims to simulate the effects of increased financial 
integration on the levels of production, consumption, and output using a stock flow 
consistent monetary model for two economies.  The study of financial integration is 
timely, as the current global financial crisis is leading economists to a re-evaluation of 
the role from international financial integration (Reinhart et al 2003, Baele et al 2004 
Pang 2008)3. 
The model describes the interaction of two economies, with five sectors in 
each economy: households, firms (a non-financial sector), government, central bank, 
and private banks.  Each sector is assumed to acquire assets (+) and have liabilities (-). 
                                                          
3
 A draft of this chapter was presented at the Eastern Economic Association meeting in Philadelphia in 
February 2010.  Helpful comments from Profs. Duncan Foley and Marc Lavoie are greatly appreciated. 
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Three scenarios are simulated to tease out the effects of a specific set of fiscal 
and monetary policies in enhancing financial integration between the two countries.  
The model assumes one country is small in terms of its gross national product, and 
the other is large in terms of its gross national product.  Using simulations we explore 
the effects of differing policy regimes on the degree of financial integration in both 
countries.   
There are several ways of measuring financial integration directly or indirectly.  
Some are based on checking the number of existing frictions and barriers to the 
intermediation process, so the more symmetric frictions and barriers the more the 
degree of financial integration.  Others concentrate on the prices of assets in each 
economy. Still others concentrate on price dispersion in representative sectors of the 
integrating economies. 
The main finding of chapter four is that monetary union has effects on the real 
and financial sides of the economy and on households' portfolio distributions, where 
households redistribute their portfolios towards the more profitable assets.  The 
convergence of asset prices and returns leads to a convergence on the households 
demand for foreign assets.   
1.1.3 PART THREE (CHAPTER FIVE) 
The third part of my thesis describes credit crises, their contagion effects, and 
analyzes those effects on income distribution and the business cycle, again using a 
stock flow consistent monetary model.  A credit crunch is assumed to spread within 
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the banking system in the country.  The crisis also spreads to other countries’ banks 
that have connections with the infected banks4. 
The model describes two open economies with five sectors in each economy: 
households, firms (non-financial sector), government, a central bank, and private 
banks.  Each sector, as before, is assumed to acquire assets (+) and have liabilities (-).  
The crucial assumption of this model is that the private banking sector in both 
economies is composed of two representative banks.  The reason behind this 
assumption is to see credit crunch contagion from one bank to other domestic and to 
foreign banks.  We assume banks in this model are connected to one another through 
interbank loans. 
A credit crunch happens because of a decline in the supply of loans to other 
sectors in the economy, as well as in the supply of interbank loans. Demand for loans 
is assumed infinitely elastic. 
Two scenarios are simulated.  The first scenario assumes a onetime increase in 
the households’ non-performing loans.  The second assumes an increase in the 
households’ non-performing loans for 5 periods.  The results of this chapter show how 
a credit crunch can spread between connected banks locally, and globally.  Credit 
crunches have a negative effect on output, consumption, investment, income in both 
countries and this effect continues as long as defaults in loans continue. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Several strands in the literature describe this channel: for example Ben Bernanke et al (1991), Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998), and Gai and Kapadia (2010). 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
7 
 
1.2 THESIS PROBLEM 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how economic shocks and policies 
affect the transaction flows between economic sectors and the level of stocks in each 
sector that, in turn, underpin an aggregate macrodynamic model.  Specifically, in this 
thesis I am going to answer the following questions: 
 How are models’ matrices—balance sheets and transactions flows—going 
to be constructed? 
 What are the theoretical foundations of the behavioral equations in the 
model? 
 What closure assumptions need to be followed? 
 What are the effects of some economic shocks and/or policies on the 
economy given specific scenarios  
 What is the role of policy analysis in such model? 
 
1.3 THESIS DESIGN 
This thesis is going to follow the stock flow consistent approach in macro 
modeling.  This approach depends upon the national income and product accounts 
and flow of funds accounts supplemented by the balance sheets for all economic 
sectors. 
The Godley and Lavoie approach describes the interactions between all 
economic sectors based on a discrete-time macro modeling of the transaction flow 
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and balance sheets matrices (see Taylor 2008).  As mentioned above, the novelty of 
this thesis is to make an extension of Godley and Lavoie models to study the impacts 
of a certain economic or financial shock on the economy to understand how fiscal or 
monetary policies can be used to overcome such shocks and correctly manage the 
economy. 
Each model in this thesis is built in three stages: construction of model 
matrices, setting-up of model equations and identities, and finally, running 
simulation experiments (termed scenarios in this thesis). 
In the first stage, I will construct the balance sheet of all economic sectors: for 
example, table 1.1 is a simple balance sheet for economic sectors in a closed economy.  
Table 1.1 describes the assets (with plus sign) and liabilities (with negative sign) of all 
economic sectors in a closed economy.  The subscripts h, f, b, g, and cb mean 
households, firms, banks, government, and the central bank respectively.  Each row 
shows that the assets of a sector are liabilities of other sectors.  All rows and columns 
in the balance sheet sum to zero except for tangible capital—the actual stock of 
machines and inventories accumulated by firms and the dwellings of households—
which is an asset that does not have a liability.  The column sum of each sector gives 
its net worth; thus, adding net worth with a negative sign to the other components 
must yield a zero result.  The matrix shows that the net worth of the whole economy 
is equal to the value of tangible capital assets. 
After completing the balance sheets, I construct the transaction flow matrix, 
which describes the flow of funds and the interaction between all economic sectors.  
Transaction flow matrix shows the sources and uses of funds between all economic 
sectors, i.e., we can see from this matrix how a transaction can be a supply of funds 
for sectors and a use of funds for other sectors. 
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Table 1.1: Simple Balance Sheet for a Closed Economy 
 Households Production 
Firms 
Banks Government Central Bank Σ 
Tangible Capital +Kh +Kf    +K 
Bills +Bh  +Bb -B + Bcb 0 
Cash +Hh  +Hb  -H 0 
Deposits +Mh  -M   0 
Loans -Lh -Lf +L   0 
Equities +Eh -Ef -Eb   0 
Net Worth -NWh -NWf -NWb -NWg 0 -K 
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: W. Godley and M. Lavoie (2007: 32) 
Table 1.2 shows a simple transaction flow matrix for a closed economy.  As in 
the balance sheet, the rows and columns of the transaction flow matrix must sum to 
zero.  The value with a plus sign means that it is a source of funds, and the value with 
a negative sign means that it is a use of funds.  The zero-sum rule for each column 
represents the budget constraint of that sector, and the zero-sum rule for each row 
means that everything that comes from somewhere must go somewhere.   
10 
 
Table 1.2: Transaction Flow Matrix for a Closed Economy 
  Households Firms Gov. Central Banks Banks Σ 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption  -C +C       0 
Investment  -Ih +I -If       
Gov. Expenditure   +G  -G     0 
Wages  +WB -WB       0 
Profits, firms  +FDf -Ff +FUf      0 
Profits, banks  +FDb      - Fb +FUb 0 
Profits, central bank     +Fcb - Fcb    0 
Interest on Loans -rl-1.Lh-1 -rl-1.Lf-1     +rl-1.L-1  0 
 Deposits +rm-1.Mh-1      - rm-1.M-1  0 
 Bills +rb-1.Bh-1   -rb-1.B-1 +rb-1.Bcb-1  +rb-1.Bb-1  0 
Taxes - transfers  -Th -Tf  +T   -Tb  0 
Change in the stocks 
of 
Loans +∆Lh  +∆Lf     -∆L 0 
 Cash -∆Hh  -∆Hf   +∆H  -∆Hb 0 
 Deposits -∆Mh       +∆M 0 
 Bills -∆Bh   +∆B  -∆Bcb  -∆Bb 0 
 Equities -(∆ef.Pef + ∆eb.Peb)  +∆ef.Pef     +∆eb.Peb 0 
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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In the second stage, I will set up the equations and identities that describe the 
economic sectors.  Table 1.3 shows the structure of the system of equations for all 
economic sectors.  The equations summarize the decision behavior, satisfy the 
balance sheet constraints, and satisfy the steady state conditions. 
Table 1.3: The Structure of the System of Equations for a Closed Economy 
Firms  Equations describing output and investment decisions 
Equations describing costing decisions 
Equations describing pricing decisions 
Equations describing portfolio decisions 
Equations describing financial implications 
Households Equations describing income and consumption decisions 
Equations describing personal loans decisions 
Equations describing portfolio decisions 
Public sector Equations describing the government decisions 
Equations describing the central bank decisions 
Banks Equations describing their duties 
Equations describing the determination of interest rates 
Equations describing the balance sheet constraints 
12 
 
Once the system of equations is complete, I will determine the closure of the 
model, which includes the steady state conditions, policy variables, and constraints 
that determine the long-run behavior of the model.  Choosing the initial conditions 
depends on some plausible stock to flow ratios and parameters.  These values must 
insure the model convergence, consistency, and to be in line with the status quo.  
Such models are not concerned about the exact values of the main variables of the 
model.  The aim of these models is analyze the evolution of the economy and how it 
behaves after a certain shock.  Values can be hypothetical and not need to be real but 
must satisfy the above conditions. 
Due to the high number of equations and identities in this model, calibrating 
the model will be not an easy task.  It can be simulated using a software package.  In 
this model E-views program is used for simulations. 
Different closure assumptions give different results.  There are a variety of 
closure assumptions in the literature such as Davidson (1972, 1994), Godley (1996, 
1997, 1999A), Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986), Tobin (1980, 1982a). 
Closure assumptions as in Godley and Lavoie treat variables as endogenous or 
exogenous, that is, they make some variables be fixed and allow for others to float, for 
example in most Godley and Lavoie models they treat real government expenditure 
and the interest rate on treasury bills as exogenous variables, so they can use the first 
as a fiscal policy lever and the second as a monetary policy lever. Tobin (1980) 
assumes that growth rates of some real variables to be exogenous like government 
expenditure growth rate, population growth rate, fixed capital growth rate. 
Taylor (2008) proposes a different closure to those in Godley and Lavoie.  
Instead of fixing the values of the interest rate on government treasury bills and a 
fixed exchange rate, Taylor fixes the values of treasury bills acquired by the central 
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banks and the values of reserves, so the banking authorities determine the money 
supply in both countries.  Macroeconomic accounting identities and figuring out how 
variables influence one another are the main determinants of stating which variables 
are endogenous or exogenous in a system of equations (Taylor, 1991: 41).  
This thesis will solve each model computationally using the software package 
E-Views5.  Given the values for parameters and exogenous variables, which contain 
the policy variables in addition to the initial values of stocks and endogenous 
variables, solving the system will provide us with the baseline scenario. 
In the third stage, I will run simulation experiments.  In each scenario, there 
will be an exploration of what will happen and how the whole economy will behave in 
the short- and long-runs starting from a given initial condition.  These scenarios are 
based on one or more of the following: changes in one or more of the policy variables, 
changes in one or more of the values of the parameters, changes in or more of the 
initial values, or changes in the behavior of the domestic or foreign agents or 
institutions. 
Results of the baseline and alternative scenarios depend upon the 
specifications of the behavioral equations, values of the parameters, values of the 
exogenous variables, and the initial values of the stocks and endogenous variables.  
Any change in the above will change the steady state values and the pattern of the 
economic behavior for macro model that describe a growing economy which does not 
spontaneously find a steady state even in the long-run. 
The data and the values of parameters, endogenous variables, and initial stocks 
and endogenous variables used in the model can be real data or hypothetical values.  
Choosing these values depends on some plausible stock to flows ratios such as capital 
                                                          
5
 To be consistent with the method used by Godley and Lavoie. 
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to output ratio and parameters such as the marginal propensities to consume out of 
disposable income and wealth and tax rates.  These values must ensure the model 
convergences, retains its consistency, and be broadly in line with the status quo.  As 
we are not concerned about the exact values of the main variables of the model after 
running the simulation, we don’t need real-world values. 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The material in this thesis is presented in six chapters including the 
introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature regarding the stock-
flow consistent approach. 
Chapter 3 is the first application of a stock flow consistent monetary model.  In 
this chapter I introduce the phenomenon of the increase in the expected house prices 
and its effects on income distribution and the business cycle for a closed economy 
with an endogenous money supply.  At the beginning I give a brief explanation to the 
problem of house price bubble happened in the US and how the economy was 
affected, mainly real output and consumption. 
Section two of this chapter gives a description for the model to be simulated to 
explore the effects of increase in house price expectations on the economy.  This 
section is divided into three subsections.  In the first subsection, I construct the 
model matrices, balance sheets matrix and transactions flows matrix.  In the second 
subsection, I set up model equations and identities.  The last subsection provides the 
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model scenarios, in which I run some simulation experiments to see the effect of a 
certain shock or policy on the economy. 
The third section concludes.  All model details like equations, variable codes, 
and parameters values are included in appendices at the end of the chapter. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are the second and third application of the stock flow 
consistent monetary models.  Chapter 4 is concerns financial integration and chapter 
5 is about credit crunch and contagion.  The contents of these chapters follow the 
same structure as in chapter 3. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT APPROACH 
 
Monetary economics is concerned with the effects of monetary institutions 
and economic policies on economic variables such as income, wealth output, 
employment, and inflation (McCallum, 1996). 
Godley and Lavoie claim that since the death of Keynes, two paradigms have 
existed each with its own interpretation of Keynes’s work: the mainstream or 
neoclassical paradigm and the post-Keynesian or the “Structuralist” paradigm (Godley 
and Lavoie, 2007: 1). 
The main difference between these two paradigms is that the mainstream is 
based on agents as the main players in the economy who, through their rational 
behavior, markets clear, and hence there is no systematic need and place for the 
interaction of institutions and specifically for loans, money, and banks. 
Post-Keynesians—of almost every variety—believe that there is an important 
role for institutions and distributional relationships in determining the macro 
behavior of the economy (Taylor, 2004b), and thus there is an essential need for 
loans, money and banks. 
18 
 
One of the shortcomings of the neoclassical paradigm, as pointed by Hahn 
(1982b: 1), is that ‘The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the 
theorist is this: the best developed model of the economy cannot find room for it’.  
Rogers (1989) says that Hahn in the above quotation refers to Arrow-Debreu model.  
But Rogers think that the difficulty extends beyond the Arrow-Debreu model to all 
other neo-Walrasian models, which cannot find a role for money. Rogers’ argument is 
persuasive, and certainly offers evidence that there is a need to include more realistic 
descriptions of money within large scale macroeconomic models.  
 Neoclassical monetary theories are generally based on the neutrality of money 
i.e. money doesn’t matter, which means that the nominal stock of money have little 
or no independent causal role to play in the economy and have no close relation with 
other economic variables. Specifically is that an exogenous change in the nominal 
stock of money has temporary effect (if any) on real variables and the long-run effect 
will be a proportional rescaling of nominal variables (Rogers, 1989). 
Post-Keynesian monetary theory deals with monetized production, so there 
will not be a separate analysis of money without the analysis of the overall action of 
the system, following Eichner and Kregel’s, (1975).  The general post-Keynesian view 
is that money matters, i.e. the variation in the nominal money stock has an important 
role in causing fluctuations in income, output, and employment in the short-run and 
in governing the inflation rate in the medium and long run in the sense of Milton 
Friedman (1968), and finally, a change in the nominal money stock has a persistent 
effects on the economy’s real variables (Cottrell, 1992). 
Another shortcoming of the neoclassical monetary theory is the assumption 
that the stock of nominal money is determined exogenously as one can see in most 
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macroeconomic textbooks.  According to Post-Keynesians6, the stock of nominal 
money is determined endogenously, and central banks do not have control over the 
stock of nominal money. 
Post-Keynesians assume that changes in the money stock are driven by the 
private sector, i.e. commercial banks are obliged to satisfy the demand for loans by 
the private sector.  To satisfy this obligation commercial banks have to attract more 
deposits from the private sector, and thus private reserves must increase to meet the 
reserves required by the central bank.  Moore (1988) and also Kaldor (1964, 1970a, and 
1982) claim that in a credit money system the supply of money is always and 
necessarily equal to the demand for money ‘supply is not only endogenously demand 
driven, but actually has no existence independent of demand’ (Cottrell, 1992: 19). 
The assumption of endogeneity of the money stock requires the interest rate to 
be exogenous (decision of the central bank).  This is true in the case of the central 
bank’s discount rate, but leaves other rates of interest to be determined.  While in the 
neoclassical monetary theory, the interest rate plays the key role to equilibrate the 
supply and the demand for money stock (Rogers 1989).  
Fiscal and monetary policies affect real economic activities, and 
macroeconomists build systems of simultaneous equations or a framework that 
describes the whole economy and explore the effects of fiscal and monetary policies 
on the economy.  Tobin (1982a), in his Nobel lecture, observes that these frameworks  
depend upon exogenous parameters including the parameters that reflect these 
                                                          
6
See Godley (1999); Godley and Lavoie (2007); Kaldor and Trevithick (1981); Moore (1988). See also 
Kaldor (1964, 1970a, 1982), Moore (1979, 1983), Rousseas (1986), Arestis and Eichner (1988), and Wray 
(1990). 
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policies such as government expenditure or tax rates a fiscal policies and interest rates 
or reserve requirements as a monetary policies. 
National income and product accounts and the flow of funds accounts provide 
the basis for these frameworks.  There are three areas of data organization and 
analysis (Patterson and Stephenson, 1988): the balance sheet, the flow of funds and 
income flows.  Any change in the balance sheet is reflected in income and in the 
allocation of the flow of funds; these accounts describe the stocks and flows in the 
economy.  The stock flow consistent approach is a natural outcome of the Keynesian 
macro model in the 1960s and 1970s (Dos Santos, 2006). 
Let us first define the stock-flow consistency.  Siegel (1979) defines stock-flow 
consistency as follows: consider two variables x(t) and y(t), then these two variables 
are stock-flow consistent if, 
y(t) = dx(t)/dt in the continuous time, and 
y(t) = ∆x(t) in the discrete time. 
To put this definition in an economic context, if x(t) is the real value of wealth, 
and then y(t) is savings—the change in the real value of wealth over time—then real 
savings is the difference between income flows including the revaluation of the 
existing net wealth and the consumption of non-durables and services (Patterson and 
Stephenson, 1988). 
The stock flow consistent approach is most closely associated with the names 
of James Tobin and Wynne Godley.  James Tobin introduces in his Nobel Prize lecture 
(1982) an alternative framework to the Keynes-Hicks model.  Tobin (1982a) argued: 
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“Hicks’s “IS-LM” version of Keynesian and classical theories has 
been espatially influential, reaching not just proffisional economists but, 
as the standarad macro model of textbooks, also generation of college 
students.  It’s simple aparatus is the trained intuition of many of us when 
we confront questions of policy and analysis, whatever more elaborate 
method we may employ in further study. But the framework has a 
number of defects that have limited its usefulness and subjected it to 
attack.  In this lecture I wish to describe an alternative framework, which 
tries to repair some of those defects.” 
Tobin’s alternative framework is what we call now the stock-flow consistent 
approach.  Tobin’s framework is based on five principal features that differentiate it 
from the standard macromodel: 
1- Precision regarding time.  Short-run macroeconomic models refer to a slice 
of time, it is one step in a dynamic model not a repetitive equilibrium in 
which the economy settles. 
2- Tracking of stocks.  An essential part of the process is the dynamics of flows 
and stocks such as investment and capital and savings and wealth.  It is not 
defensible to ignore these relations on the excuse that the analysis refers to 
so short time such that stocks do not change significantly. 
3- Several assets and rate of returns.  Nonmonetary asset aggregation does not 
permit analysis of some important policies, institutional structure, and 
events.  Disaggregation of assets is essential for analyzing, among other 
phenomena, financing of capital accumulation and government deficits, 
details of monetary and debt management policies, international capital 
movements and foreign exchange markets, and financial intermediation. 
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4- Modeling financial and monetary policy operations.  Too often 
macroeconomic models describe monetary policy as a change in the stock 
of money whose time path is chosen by the central authority without 
describing the operations that implement the policy.  In fact government 
transactions with the public, or by similar transactions between banks and 
nonbank public affects the supply of money stocks.  “What transactions are 
the source of variation of money stocks makes a difference, depending on 
how they alter the wealth and the portfolio positions of economic agents” 
(Tobin 1982a: 173). 
5- Sectoral budget and adding-up constraints.  Walras’s law says that excess 
demand functions of an economic agent must sum to zero.  The law 
imposes the consistency of meeting the budget constraint on the schedules 
of demand and supply, which agents communicate to all the markets in 
which they participate. 
Godley in the 1990s makes a link between his previous work—tracking income 
flows and the money/debt stock through time—and Tobin’s work, which focuses on 
portfolio choice by economic actors, and rates of return. 
Other features of stock flow consistent models are first, to incorporate real and 
financial relations for all economic sectors in a consistent way (Dos Santos and Zezza, 
2005); consequently, all flows to one economic sector are coming from other sectors, 
so inflows to one sector are outflows from other sectors (there cannot be any black 
holes).  Second, ‘the fact that money stocks and flows must satisfy accounting 
identities in individual budgets and in an economy as a whole provides a fundamental 
law of macroeconomics analogous to the principle of conservation of energy in physics’ 
(Godley and Cripps, 1983: 18).  Third, there are intrinsic dynamics that reflect the 
dynamic behavior of a certain logical relationships, which constrain the system of 
CHAPTER 2 – STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT APPROACH 
 
23 
 
equations of the model.  Fourth, there are lag dynamics, which insure that causes 
precede effects, and these lags are important to avoid telescoping time (Hicks, 1965). 
Another important feature of the stock flow consistent models is the 
quadruple entry principle, which is attributed to Copeland (1949 (1996: 8)).  Copeland 
pointed out that, ‘because moneyflows transactions involve two transactors, the social 
accounting approach to moneyflows rests not on a double-entry system but on a 
quadruple-entry system’.  Any change in the sources of funds of a sector must be 
compensated by at least one change in the uses of funds of the same sector.  But any 
transaction must have counterparty.  Therefore the above two changes must be 
accompanied by at least two changes in the uses and sources of funds of another 
sector. 
In stock flow consistent models there is no need for rational expectations; 
agents react to disequilibria on the basis of partial adjustment functions.  In Godley’s 
models, agents are assumed to be reasonably rational, they react to new information, 
they entertain norms, and they may revise these norms. 
Among these norms is that real households’ consumption function determined 
by the real stock of households’ wealth inherited from the previous period together 
with the expected flow of real disposable income.  There are lots of firms norms, 
among these norms is that firms operating within the normal range of outputs at 
which running cost per unit of output are constant, and that they base their decision 
regarding production, prices, and employment on the quantity they expect to sell 
profitably plus an adjustment to inventory levels they wish to achieve.  In the case of 
the government, these norms are well known, where political discussion often 
concentrate on sustainable debt to GDP ratio. 
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Stock flow consistent models can best be solved by simulations, because these 
models easily run up a high number of equations (Godley and Lavoie, 2007).  Stock 
flow consistent models can be calibrated, but it will be a difficult task given the high 
number of variables and parameters. 
Godley and Lavoie provide a promising approach by building a stock flow 
consistent macroeconomic model in a discrete-time frame. Most post-Keynesian 
economists concentrate on flows and prices rather than stocks of assets and liabilities 
and on comparative statics rather than dynamic analysis of policy changes; omission 
of these stocks from a model may lead to false predictions of the policy changes 
(Davis, 1987).  The stock flow consistent approach was created to prevent these 
problems from happening (Dos Santos, 2006; Tobin, 1982a: 188). 
Godley and Lavoie models have Kaleckian and/or Kaldorian overtones because 
most of the Kaleckian or Kaldorian features are incorporated in Godley and Lavoie 
models—the real markets (products and labor) are assumed to be demand-led but 
supply constrained, imperfect competition, imperfect information, markup pricing, 
fixed technical coefficients, the relevance of income distribution, the role of capacity 
utilization and corporate retained profits, the importance of lags and time, long-run 
trends being conceived as ‘a slowly changing component of a chain of short period 
situations’ (Kalecki, 1971). 
In neoclassical theory, markets are assumed to clear through changes in prices, 
while in the stock flow consistent approach markets clear either by assuming that 
quantity supplied adjust to demand within the period or because of buffers.  The price 
mechanism plays a role in the demand and the supply in the stock market equities 
(Godley and Lavoie, 2007).  Stock flow consistent models normally have a buffer for 
each sector such as stocks of inventories and loans for producing firms, Money 
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deposits for households, Bills held, or advances from the central bank, for private 
banks, Bills issued for the government. 
However, Godley and Lavoie construct FAMs with complex cross-holdings of 
various securities by economic sectors, but do not take into consideration decades of 
financial innovations (Taylor, 2008).  Another limit of Godley and Lavoie stock flow 
consistent models is when more realistic models are been considered, the number of 
equations rise very quickly i.e. we’ll have large models.  Finally, in Godley and Lavoie 
models there was no attempt at calibration, and it needs more efforts to put in 
calibration and put into empirical work. 
Taylor (2008) published a review article of Godley and Lavoie.  He derived 
some interesting macrodynamic modeling consequences of the Godley and Lavoie 
type of stock flow consistent model, in particular, the possibility of deriving a concise 
macroeconomic model of price formation, (functional) income distribution, and 
business cycles, underpinned by strict stock-flow consistency at many levels of 
disaggregation.  The resulting macrodynamic model encapsulates aggregate money 
dynamics built up from consistent inter-sectoral real-money flows. 
The main contribution of this thesis will be to extend Godley and Lavoie 
models in a way to include more securities and present a more modern financial 
system for the years leading into 2007.  Another attempt will be to model and analyze 
the recent shocks, which cause or trigger the recent financial crisis like the house 
price bubble, credit crunch, and financial integration. 
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Chapter 3 
 
HOUSE PRICE VARIATIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The collapse in housing and credit markets are two of the most visible effects 
of the recent financial crisis.  Proposed causes of these collapses include, inter alia: 
the inability of home owners to make their mortgage payments, overextension by 
borrowers, predatory lending, speculation and overbuilding during the boom period, 
risky mortgage products, high personal and corporate debt levels, monetary policy, 
international trade imbalances, and inappropriate government regulations (Stiglitz, 
2008; Steverman, 2009; and Roubini, 2009). 
Figure 3.1 shows the quarterly appreciation of the house price index (HPI) for 
US during the period 2000Q1 – 2010Q1.  The index shows the increase in the house 
prices in the US until the end of the second quarter of 2007.  After this, house prices 
started to fall until 2010. 
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Figure 3.1: Seasonally adjusted house price index for USA (qarterly appreciation) 
 
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
The decline in house prices has a direct impact not only on home valuations, 
but also on credit markets, home builder activities, real estate, households, and 
national output.  Due to the sharp decline in house prices, homeowners found 
themselves in a position of negative equity: with mortgage debt higher than the value 
of the property.  Under conditions of negative equity, households become unable to 
fulfill their obligations, which can lead to failures in the banking system. Under 
negative equity, household consumption may decline, which of course affects any 
measure of national output.  Figure 3.2 shows the percentage change of real GDP and 
real personal consumption in the US during the period 1997 – 2009.  The figure shows 
that the real GDP and the real personal consumption start to slow after 2004 and the 
start to decline in 2008 in the US.  
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
%
HPI
CHAPTER 3 – HOUSE PRICE VARIATIONS 
 
29 
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage change of real GDP and real personal consumption in the US 
 
Source: Bureau of economic analysis. 
Baker (2002) argues that there is no fundamental reason behind the increase in 
home prices since 1995 in the US.  Baker contends the only plausible explanation for 
the increase in home prices is the existence of a house-price bubble, which means 
that the only factor driving housing sales is the expectation that housing prices will be 
higher in the future.  Baker predicts that the collapse of the housing bubble will lead 
to a loss in housing wealth and a slow in the economy via derailing housing 
construction and its attendant impacts on consumption through wealth effects. 
Bernanke (2007), in his speech, states that the decline in housing markets 
across the US has been sharp since the summer of 2005.  Sales of new and existing 
homes declined significantly, house prices declined, and the residential construction 
declined, which reduced the annual rate of US economic growth.  
Igan and Rebucci (2008) use the vector autoregression (VAR) model for several 
advanced countries to estimate the implications of the housing sector in the business 
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cycle and in the monetary policy transmission mechanism of each country.  Their 
results show that due to the innovations in mortgage markets, the housing sector 
could be a source of macroeconomic instability.  They claim that monetary policy is 
now transmitted more through the price of homes than through residential 
investments. 
McCarthy and Peach (2004) use a VAR model of the US housing market in the 
years before 2004 and find a little evidence to support the existence of a house price 
bubble.  Their analysis is based on house price to income ratio and rent to house price 
ratio from 1980 until 2003.  A structural model is built in such a way that the 
equilibrium price per unit of housing established in the market for the existing stock 
determines the rate of gross addition.  They argue that the key variables determining 
demand for existing stock of houses are the permanent income and the user cost of 
residential buildings.  Their econometric results suggest that home prices have risen 
in line with the increase in personal income and declines in nominal interest rates. 
Bjornland and Jacobsen (2010) analyze the role of housing prices in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in Norway, Sweden, and the UK using VAR 
models.  They find, in contrast to McCarthy and Peach, that the role of house prices 
in the monetary transmission mechanism to increase considerably in these countries.  
Bjornland and Jacobsen also find that the interest rate responds systematically to 
change in house prices, while the timing of the response varies between the countries. 
Steiner (2010) estimates the determinants of the residential capital stock, 
residential investment, and housing prices in Switzerland in a stock-flow framework.  
Her empirical results indicate that the desired level of residential capital stock can 
diverge from the existing residential capital stock for several years (3 to 5 years).  The 
results show that housing prices clear the imbalances between the desired and the 
existing residential capital stock. 
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Zezza published two papers in 2007 and 2008 on the US housing market using 
a stock-flow consistent approach.  The two papers present a model for a closed 
growing economy with a housing market and two classes of households, capitalists 
and workers.  In his models both capitalists and workers express demand for houses, 
but capitalists finance their demand for houses from their equity/ wealth, which 
contains financial assets while workers, whose only incomes come from wages and 
interests on their bank deposits, finance their demand for houses by taking mortgage 
loans from private banks. 
In both models, Zezza assumes an exogenous shock to expected house prices. 
The short-run results show an increase in actual house prices, increase in demand for 
houses, and increases in real output.  But later, each of these variables declines to 
levels close to pre-shock levels. 
Price variations in the housing market are not broadly analyzed in stock flow 
consistent models and the importance of modeling price variations is to show its 
short and long term impact on the whole economy, especially since house price 
bubbles are considered to be one of the main reasons of the recent financial crisis.  
Modeling these phenomena is necessary for developing proper fiscal and monetary 
policies to prevent such crises from happening. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in the second section, the model is 
constructed in which a description of the model will be introduced, model matrices 
will be constructed, and some simulation experiments will be conducted.  The third 
section concludes. 
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3.2 THE MODEL 
The model deployed in this chapter describes a steady state country with five 
sectors: households, firms (non-financial sector), government, central bank, and 
private banks.  Each sector is assumed to acquire assets (+) and have liabilities (-).  
This model builds on Zezza (2007) and (2008), but with one class of households and 
assumes a steady state economy instead of growing economy. 
3.2.1 MODEL MATRICES 
Table 3.1 provides the balance sheet of the model.  As described above the 
model contains five sectors.  Regarding the households sector, it’s assumed that 
households acquire houses (+Ho), high powered money (+Hh d), bank deposits (+Md), 
government securities, treasury bills used as a proxy of government securities, (+Bh d), 
and firm equities (+ed.pe).  Households are assumed to take mortgages from banks (-
Lm d) in order to finance part of their demand for houses. The sum of all households’ 
assets and liabilities is households’ wealth (V). 
Table 3.1: Balance sheet matrix 
 
 
Households Firms Government Central 
Bank 
Banks Σ 
Fixed Capital  +K    +K 
Houses +Ho +Hu    +Ho+Hu 
HPM +Hh d   -Hs +Hb d 0 
Advances    +As -Ad 0 
Deposits +Md    -Ms 0 
Bills +Bh d  -Bs +Bcb d +Bb d 0 
Equities +ed.Pe -es.Pe    0 
Loans  -Lf d   +Lf s 0 
Mortgages -Lm d    +Lm s  
Balance -V -NWf -NWg 0 0 -(K+Ho+Hu) 
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Firms are assumed to own tangible assets—fixed capital (+K) and a stock of 
unsold houses (+Hu).  Fixed capital and unsold houses have no counterpart liabilities 
in other sectors.  Fixed capital is only an asset; it is not simultaneously an asset and a 
liability, as is the case of financial capital.  Firms take loans from banks (-Lf d) and 
supply equities to households (-es.pe) to finance their investments.  The sum of these 
assets and liabilities is the net worth of firms (NWf).  
The government is assumed to supply securities (treasury bills, -Bs) to other 
sectors in the economy. These securities are the negative net worth of the 
government (NWg).  The central bank is assumed to acquire government securities 
(+Bcb d) and supply advances (+As) to banks on demand.  The central bank uses these 
assets to supply high powered money (+Hs) to households and to banks. 
Regarding private banks, they are assumed to have vault cash (+Hb d), acquire 
government securities (+Bb d), supply mortgages to households (+Lm s), and supply 
loans to firms (+Lf s).  Banks also accept deposits (-Ms) from households and take 
advances from the central bank (-Ad). 
Table 3.2 describes the transactions and flows within, and between, economic 
sectors in the country in a given period of time.  Variables with (+) sign describe 
sources of funds, and variables with (-) sign describe uses of funds.  Each row and 
column in the transactions flows matrix must sum to zero.  In the firms’ current 
account column, firms produce consumption goods and services to households (+Cs) 
and to the government (+Gs), investment to its capital account (+If), and construct 
new houses (+p.hn). 
Firms pay taxes on sales to the government (-T), wages to households (-WB), 
interests on loans (-rl-1.Lf d-1), and keep part of their funds to cover any depreciation in 
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their fixed capital (-δk.K).  The depreciation allowances go the firms’ capital accounts.  
The difference between sources and uses of funds in the firm’s current account is its 
profits (-Ff), which transferred to households as they are considered to be the owners 
of firms. 
Other sources of funds besides the depreciation allowance, which appear in 
the capital account column are new loans (+∆Lf d) and new equities (+∆ es.Pe).  These 
sources of funds are used to cover new investments on tangible capital and the stock 
of unsold houses, which appears in the capital account of firms. 
Households in this model are assumed to earn wages from firms; profits from 
firms (+Ff) and banks (+Fb), interests on their deposits (+rm-1.Md-1), and interests on 
their holdings of treasury bills (+rb-1.Bh d-1).  Households use part of their income to 
cover for their consumption. 
Households use sources of funds to pay for their consumption to firms and 
interests, on mortgages, to banks (-rmo-1.Lm d-1).  Households use their savings to buy 
real and financial assets and use new mortgages to cover part of the acquired houses. 
The government receives taxes (+T) from firms and takes the central bank profits 
(+Fcb).  The government pays interests on treasury bills supplied to the other sectors 
(-rb-1.Bs).  The sum of the government’s sources and uses of funds determines the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).  The government is assumed to cover its 
PSBR by issuing new treasury bills (+∆Bs). 
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Table 3.2: Transactions flows matrix 
  
Households 
Firms 
Gov. 
Central Banks Banks 
Σ 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption  -C +C       0 
Gov. Expenditure   +G  -G     0 
Investment in F. capital   +If -If      0 
Depreciation of F. capital   -δk.K-1 +δk.K-1      0 
Investment in housing  -ph.[∆ho+δh.ho-1] +ph.hn -ph.∆hu      0 
Sales Tax   -T  +T     0 
Wages  +WB -WB       0 
Entrepreneurial Profits  +Ff -Ff       0 
Bank Profits  +Fb      - Fb  0 
Central Bank Profits     +Fcb - Fcb    0 
Interest on Advances     +ra-1.As-1  - ra-1.Ad-1  0 
Loans  -rl-1.Lf d-1     +rl-1.Lf s-1  0 
Mortgages -rmo-1.Lm d-1      + rmo-1.Lm s-1  0 
Deposits +rm-1.Md-1      - rm-1.Ms-1  0 
Bills +rb-1.Bh d-1   -rb-1.Bs-1 +rb-1.Bcb d-1  +rb-1.Bb d-1  0 
Change in the stocks of Advances      -∆As  +∆Ad 0 
Loans   +∆Lf d     -∆Lf s 0 
Mortgages +∆Lm d       -∆Lm s 0 
Cash -∆Hh d     +∆Hs  -∆Hb d 0 
Deposits -∆Md       +∆Ms 0 
Bills -∆Bh d   +∆Bs  -∆Bcb d  -∆Bb d 0 
Equities -∆ ed. Pe  +∆ es. Pe      0 
Σ  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The central bank receives interests on its holdings of treasury bills from the 
government, (+rb-1.Bcb d-1), and from its supply of advances to banks (+ra-1.As-1).  The 
sum of these various interests, as shown in the current column, is the central bank’s 
profits, and they are transferred completely to the government as shown in table 3.2.  
The central bank acquires treasury bills (-∆Bcb d) and supplies advances (-∆As) to 
private banks.  These uses of funds are compensated by issuing more high-powered 
money (+∆Hs) to households and to private banks as shown in the capital account 
column. 
Banks receive interests on mortgages to the households sector, on loans to 
firms, and on their holdings of treasury bills (+rb-1.Bb d-1).  Banks pay interests to 
households on money deposits (+rm-1.Ms-1) and to the central bank on advances (-ra-
1.Ad-1).  The difference between the ingoing interests and outgoing interests, as shown 
in the current account column, equals to the bank profits (-Fb), which go to 
households.  The change in banks’ financial assets and liabilities sum to zero due to 
the assumption that banks do not have net worth as shown in the capital account 
column. 
3.2.2 MODEL EQUATIONS 
In this subsection, a general description of model equations and identities are 
introduced.  Detailed equations and identities can be found in appendix 3.A.  These 
equations and identities describe the balance sheets and transactions flows 
constraints and the behavior of each economic sector.  The uppercase variables are in 
nominal values and the lower case variables are in real terms.  Most of the model 
equations and identities are taken from Godley and Lavoie (2007). 
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Firms’ nominal output, GDP, equal to the values of consumption, government 
expenditure, and investment. 
        
Firm’s real sales are the sum of real households’ consumption, real government 
expenditure, and real investment. 
        
Firms’ decision regarding production is equal to their expected sales. 
     
At any period, t, the price level of goods and services is a mark up, φ, on unit 
costs.  All profits earned by firms as a result of the mark up are assumed to be 
transferred to the households as they are considered to be the owners of firms. 
                 
where   is the tax rate on firms’ sales. 
Residential construction firms, which considered in this model as a part of the 
firms sector, set the price of newly built houses as a function of unsold houses and 
general price level. 
          
              
where hun is the normal level of unsold houses.  Residential construction firms work 
to guarantee that they have stock of houses to be available in case of an increase in 
the demand for houses.  The following equations state that the change in the normal 
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stock of unsold houses is a portion of the difference between the expected stock of 
existing houses and the previous level of stock of existing houses acquired by 
households. 
                  
where hoe is the expected stock of existing houses in the households sector. 
Firms’ real investment decision is divided into two parts: the first is the 
investment on physical capital and the other is the investment in housing.  
Investment in physical capital is a function of the difference between the actual and 
the target real fixed capital plus the depreciation allowance of fixed capital. 
        
              
               
Firms’ supply of new houses equals the difference between expected stock of 
existing houses and the previous stock of existing houses acquired by households, the 
difference between the normal level of unsold houses and the stock of unsold houses 
left from the previous period, and the depreciation allowance on existing houses 
acquired by households. 
                 
                
Total firms volume of investment is equal to the sum of investment in physical 
capital and the investment in houses. 
The new level of unsold houses is equal to what is left form the new built 
houses after what has been sold in addition to the depreciation in houses. 
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Firms in this model are assumed to take new loans and issue new equities to 
cover for their net investment on physical capital and the value of new unsold houses. 
                                
Households’ disposable income is equal to what they earn in terms of wages, 
profits, and interests minus what they pay as interests on mortgages to banks.  
Households in this model are assumed to pay no tax to the government. 
                                               
Households’ savings or the change in their wealth is what left from their 
disposable income after consumption. 
        
Households’ real consumption is a function of their expected real disposable 
income and their real wealth level in the previous period. 
                  
Households are assumed to acquire real capital like houses and financial assets 
like cash money, deposits, treasury bills, and firms’ equities.  Demand for cash money 
is considered to be a portion of the households’ consumption.  Demand for other 
financial assets depends on the rates of return of those assets, as in Tobin (1969) and 
in Godley and Lavoie (2007).  Equations of households’ portfolio decision on financial 
assets are listed in appendix 3.A.  It is worth noting that the demand for deposits in 
the households’ sector play the buffer role as described in appendix 3.A.  Demand for 
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new houses depends upon their disposable income and the expected rate of return on 
houses, reh. 
                 
  
where reh depends on the growth rate of expected house prices, p
e
h, interest rate on 
mortgages, and rental rate on houses.  Interest rate on mortgages and the rent inter 
considered as the opportunity costs of acquiring houses. 
   
   
     
  
          
where,   
        . 
Households are assumed to take new mortgages to cover part of their demand 
for houses. 
                             
where rep is mortgage repayments each period, which is assumed to be 10% of 
mortgage value. 
The government is assumed to sell treasury bills to households, banks, and the 
central bank.  In this model, the government is assumed to cover its borrowing 
requirements by issuing new treasury bills. 
                         
         
The central bank is assumed to take what is left from treasury bills after what 
has been sold to households and to private banks. 
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The central bank is assumed to supply advances to banks equal to their 
demand.  Thus, central bank receives interests on its holdings of treasury bills and its 
supply of advances.  These interests considered as the central bank profits, which are 
totally transferred to the government.  The central bank supplies high-powered 
money to households and banks based on its holdings of treasury bills and its supply 
of advances to banks.  The central bank supply of high powered money is constrained 
by its balance sheet, see table 3.1. 
            
Banks are assumed to accept deposits from households, supply loans and 
mortgages to firms and households respectively based on their demand, take 
advances from the central bank, acquire treasury bills, and keep vault cash.  The last 
is assumed to be a portion of deposits; this portion is set by the central bank.  
Advances taken from the central bank is to keep a certain level of liquidity.  If bank 
liquid assets decline, then it asks for advances to fulfill its short-term obligations. 
               
Bank’s demand for treasury bills is assumed to be constrained by its balance 
sheet. 
                          
Finally, banks set the interest rate on loans and mortgages as functions depend 
upon their profit margin and the interest rate on advances.  Banks set the interest rate 
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on deposits as a function depend upon their liquidity ratio and interest rate on 
advances.  The detailed equations are in appendix 3.A. 
In this model, the redundant, or the hidden, equation is that the central bank 
supplies high powered money to banks on demand. 
          
The above equation can be derived from equation 3.59 (see appendix 3.E).  
Including the redundant equation in the model makes it over determined and the 
model will not solve, and thus, the redundant equation will be excluded from the 
model. 
3.2.3 MODEL SIMULATIONS 
The baseline scenario assumes that the economy is in a steady state condition, 
in other words, stocks do not change and flows stays on the same level.  The 
simulation of each scenario will be for various random seeds, over a 51 notional 
periods. 
The first scenario (increase in the expected house prices) 
The first scenario assumes that households expect that house prices are going 
to increase.  Expected house prices are assumed to equal house prices in the present 
period plus a random variable (μ) that may have a positive or negative value, see 
equation 3.19 in appendix 3.A.  When households expect house prices to increase, μ 
will have a positive value and expected house prices will continue increasing as long 
as μ has a positive value.  In this scenario it is also assumed that expected house prices 
increase for one period and stay there for another four periods before they return to 
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their previous level before the shock.  The simulation of this scenario will explore the 
effect of a 0.5 point increase in the expected house prices starting from period 5. 
Figure 3.3 shows that effect of the increase in expected house prices on real 
output.  The figure shows that real output increases after the shock.  This increase 
lasts for several periods but later a substantial decline happened to real output. 
Figure 3.3: Evolution of real output after the increase in expected house prices 
 
After the increase in expected house prices, households demand for houses 
increases due to the increase on the rate of return in housing, see equation 3.40.  The 
increase in the demand for houses leads to a decline in the stock of unsold houses and 
as a consequence, firms increase housing construction, which leads to an increase in 
the output.  Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the demand and the supply of houses 
after the shock. 
The figure shows that the supply of houses increases after one period of the 
increase in the demand for houses because construction of houses depends upon the 
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expected change in the demand for houses.  Another thing, the shock leads to 
imbalances in the demand for and the supply of houses.  These imbalances last for 
several periods before they return to the levels before the shock.  The increase in 
demand for houses leads to an increase in actual house prices. Figure 3.5 shows the 
evolution of house prices and expected house prices after the shock. 
Figure 3.4: Demand and supply of houses after the increase in expected house prices 
 
Figure 3.5: Evolution of house prices after the increase in expected house prices 
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The increase in the demand for houses and the increase in the value of existing 
houses acquired by households lead to an increase in the demand for mortgages.  
Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of mortgages demand after the increase in expected 
house prices. 
Figure 3.6: Evolution of mortgages demand after the increase in expected house prices 
 
The increase in house prices lead to an increase in households’ wealth and the 
increase in firms’ sales of houses leads to an increase in their profits and also wages, 
and thus households’ disposable income.  Both factors lead to an increase in 
households’ consumption.  Figure 3.7 shows the evolution of real households’ wealth, 
disposable income, and consumption. 
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of real households' wealth, real disposable income, and real consumption after the 
increase in expected house prices 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the change in the demand for deposits, treasury bills, and 
equities as a share of (Vfma) against the baseline values after the shock.  The volatility 
in the demand for financial assets comes from the volatility in the demand for houses 
and from the volatility in the disposable income.  The increase in firms’ profits 
increases the rate of return on equities, which leads to an increase in households’ 
demand for equities and a decline in the demand for treasury bills.  The residual of 
financial market assets wealth goes for deposits, which explains the increase in the 
demand for deposits as the value of wealth increases. 
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Figure 3.8: Change of deposits, T. bills, and equities as a share of financial market assets wealth against 
the baseline values after the increase in the expected house prices 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the change in banks the demand for advances, the demand 
for treasury bills, and the supply of loans to firms against the baseline values after the 
shock in expected house prices.  The increase in house prices leads to a direct increase 
in the demand for mortgages as shown in figure 3.6.  With the increase in households’ 
demand for deposits and with the decline in firms’ demand for loans, banks’ demand 
for bills increases and their demand for advances decreases noting that the increase in 
banks’ demand for bills is higher than households’ demand for deposits.  Due to the 
decline in the stock of unsold houses and the increase in the supply of equities to 
households, firms’ demands for new loans tend to decline. 
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Figure 3.9: Change in banks' advances, T. bills, and loans to firms after an increase in the 
expected house prices
 
Figure 3.10: Evolution of government budget balance after an increase in the expected house prices 
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Figure 3.10 in this scenario shows the evolution of government budget balance 
after the shock in the expected house prices.  Due to the increase in firms’ sales, taxes 
on sales increase, which leads to a government budget surplus in the short run, but 
later the surplus starts to decline and turn to deficit. 
Figure 3.3 above shows that real output starts to decline after several periods of 
increase.  This decline is due to two factors, the first is the decline in households’ 
consumption and the second is the decline in firms’ construction of new houses.  
Expected house prices are assumed to increase 0.5 points for 5 periods and after that 
they return to their previous levels before the shock.  The return in house price 
expectations lead to a decline in the demand for houses and thus housing sales and 
thus house prices.  The decline in the existing house prices leads to a decline in 
households’ wealth and thus consumption.  When new house sales decline, firms’ 
profits decline and also wages, this leads to a decline in households’ disposable 
income and thus consumption. 
The decline in new houses construction leads to a decline in firms’ 
investments.  Both factors, the decline in households’ consumption and firms’ 
investments lead to a decline in the real output, which can be seen in the figures 
above. 
The imbalances between the demand and the supply of houses after the shock 
play an important role in the volatility of real output and the other main indicators.  
Figure 3.4 shows that the supply of houses goes higher than the demand after the 
shock.  Due to the excess supply, stock of unsold houses increases, which leads to a 
decline in the construction of new houses to levels lower than the demand for houses.  
This mechanism continues until the demand for houses equals the supply of houses 
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and the end of the shock helps the economy as a whole to return to its previous levels 
before the shock. 
The second scenario (increase in government expenditure)  
The second scenario assumes that due to the decline in the real output, the 
government intervenes to help the economy to stop the decline and to stimulate the 
economy.  In this scenario, the government increases its expenditure, as a fiscal 
policy, by 0.3% for one period only then return to its previous level. 
Figure 3.11 shows the evolution of the real output after the increase in the 
expected house prices and the increase in the real government expenditure.  As 
shown in the figure, increasing real government expenditure increases the real 
output.  The increase in real output lasts for one period then declines, because the 
policy is taken for one period only.  But this policy makes the economy better off 
compared with the first scenario. 
Increasing real government expenditure will stimulate the economy as a 
whole, by increasing the sales, which will be reflected on profits, wages, disposable 
income, consumption, and wealth.  Regarding the government budget balance, due to 
the increased government expenditure, the deficit will increase but later, the deficit 
declines due to the increase in sales tax collections. 
The increase in households’ disposable income increases the demand for 
houses and also the demand for mortgages.  The increase in households’ demand for 
houses stimulates firms’ investments, which in turn increases sales and thus output. 
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Figure 3.11: Evolution of the real output before and after the fiscal policy 
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Figure 3.12: The difference between banks' demand for advances, supply of mortgages and loans in the 
case of fiscal policy and in the case of no fiscal policy 
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Figure 3.13 shows the evolution of real output after applying monetary policy.  
It shows that the applied monetary policy makes the real output slightly better off.  As 
shown in the figure, the applied monetary policy do not succeed to stop the decline in 
the real output but it succeeds to decrease the degree of fall. 
Interest rate on advances has a direct effect on the interest rate on deposits, 
mortgages, and loans.  In this model decreasing interest rate on advances does not 
affect either the demand for advances or the demand for loans by firms, because the 
demand for advances and loans do not depend upon their respective interest rate, see 
equations 3.26 and 3.70.  When the interest rate on mortgages declines in response to 
the decline in the interest rate on advances, rate of return on housing increases and 
leads to an increase in demand for houses, which stimulates investment and thus real 
output.  When firms’ sales increase firms’ profits increase too, which leads to an 
increase in households’ disposable income and consumption and thus the real output. 
Figure 3.13: Evolution of the real output before and after the monetary policy 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
The model presented in this chapter describes the impact of house price 
variations on the business cycle using a stock flow consistent model.  This chapter 
builds on Zezza (2007) and (2008), but with single households’ class and a deeper 
analysis for the real and financial sides of the economy. 
Despite the fact that the model does not necessarily reflect the real world, it 
can explain a part of the recent financial crisis by modeling the house price bubble, 
which considered as one of the main contributors of the recent financial crisis.  The 
model shows that the increase in expected house prices leads to an increase in the 
most macroeconomic variables, but several periods after the incidence of the shock, a 
fall in the output of almost all economic activities and in households’ wealth and 
income takes place due to the fact that, in this model, expected house prices go back 
down after several periods of increase. 
Due to the assumption of several periods’ increase in expected house prices, 
the effect of this shock is not going to continue in the long-run, but it will have an 
effect on the short and medium-runs.  An intervention by the government and/ or the 
central bank is needed to recover the economy to levels before the shock particularly 
when such shocks continue for longer periods.  Three simulation experiments 
(scenarios) are conducted in addition to the baseline scenario, which assumes a 
stationary steady state in the economy. 
The first scenario assumes an increase in the expected house prices in the 
economy, the second introduces a fiscal policy to see if the economy recovers after 
the decline in the economy, and the third assumes that the central bank implements 
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a monetary policy.  These scenarios are analyzed to determine what will happen to 
the economy after the decline7.   
The model shows that the economy experiences a boom at the beginning after 
the house prices increase.  This boom has a positive effect on the economy, wealth, 
and the distribution of income, but after some periods the economy starts to 
deteriorate when expected house prices drop.  This chapter proposes that an increase 
in assets’ prices (real or financial) will have a positive effects on the economy in the 
short-run, but after some periods will turn to have negative effects and these effects 
will be bigger as long as the shock continues.  The results show that fiscal and 
monetary policies are important in stimulating the economy, but more specific 
policies are also needed to help the economy and prevent such shocks from 
happening in the future. 
The model shows that fiscal policy has a more direct effect on the economy 
than monetary policy.  Increasing pure real government expenditure (fiscal policy) 
leads to a direct turning point in the economy and starts the recovery phase and does 
not take long time to return to its previous levels, while the monetary policy 
implemented in this model has a very minor effect on the decline. 
Several steps can be taken to expand this model to better reflect the real world.  
One direction is to assume a permanent shock in expected house prices and/ or 
permanent fiscal and monetary measures.  One could expand this model for an open 
economy, and/ or includes two classes of households.  Another dimension is to see 
                                                          
7
 Another scenario can be conducted in this model, which assumes both fiscal and monetary policies 
implemented to see the effect on the economy.  One can predict that both fiscal and monetary policies 
can help the economy better than one policy alone. 
 
56 
 
the effects of the shock on a more complex financial sector than presented here or 
one can check the effect of an increase in households’ debt burden due to the increase 
in house prices and mortgages, which is not modeled in this chapter. 
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3.4 APPENDIX 3.A: MODEL EQUATIONS 
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3.5 APPENDIX 3.B: MODEL CODES 
Before defining the variables, the following notations must take into consideration: 
1- The subscript b refers bank. 
2- The subscript cb refers central bank. 
3- The subscript d refers to demand. 
4- The superscript e refers expected value or volume. 
5- The subscript f = firms. 
6- The subscript h = households. 
7- The subscript l refers loans. 
8- The subscript m refers deposits. 
9- The subscript mo refers mortgages. 
10- The superscript T refers target value or volume. 
 
A Advances 
B Government security (treasury bills) e.g. Bh d is households demand treasury bills 
B
n
b d Notional bank demand for treasury bills 
BLR
 
Bank liquidity ratio 
BLR
n 
Bank liquidity ratio net of advances 
BPM
 
Bank profit margin 
C
 
Nominal consumption 
c
 
Real consumption 
e
 
Number of equities 
Fb Bank profits 
Fcb Central bank profits 
Ff Firms profits 
G
 
Nominal government expenditure 
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g
 
Real government expenditure 
Hs High powered money supplied by the central bank 
Hb Vault cash 
Hh Households cash money 
Hn Value of new houses 
hn Number of new houses 
Ho Value of households’ housing stock 
ho Number of existing houses acquired by households 
Hu Value of unsold houses 
hu Number of unsold houses 
I
 
Nominal investment 
i
 
Real investment 
K
 
Nominal fixed capital 
k
 
Real fixed capital 
κ Target capital ratio 
Lf Firms loans 
Lm Mortgages 
M
 
Money deposits 
N
 
Number of employees 
p General price level 
pe Equity price 
Ph Existing houses price level 
φ Price mark-up 
π Price inflation 
pr
 Workers’ productivity 
PSBR
 
Public sector borrowing requirement 
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ra Interest rate on advances 
rb Treasury bills interest rate 
rh Rate of return in housing 
rk Rate of return on equities 
rl Loans interest rate 
rm Deposits interest rate 
rmo Mortgages interest rate 
rent Houses rent service 
rep Households’ mortgage repayments 
S
 
Nominal sales 
s
 
Real sales 
T
 
Taxes 
UC Unit cost 
V
 
Nominal wealth 
Vfma Financial market assets wealth 
v
 
Real wealth 
W
 
Wage rate 
WB
 
Wage bill 
Y
 
Nominal output or GDP 
y
 
Real GDP 
YD
 
Nominal disposable income 
Yd
 
Real disposable income 
yd
e
 Expected real disposable income 
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3.6 APPENDIX 3.C: PARAMETERS VALUES 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
α0 96.5 
 
 λc 0.1 
α1 0.7  Ω 0.015603 
α2 0.05    0.12782 
β1 0.5  ψ
 
0.5 
β2 0.5  ρ
 
0.1 
δh 0.1  σ 1.0 
δk 0.1  τ 0.2481 
ε
 
0.5  ξb 0.0001 
η1 0.1  ξl 0.0001 
η2 0.5  ξmo 0.0001 
γk 0.5  ζ1 0.1 
κ 0.35782  ζ2 0.5 
λ20 0.197238    
λ21 -0.5    
λ22 1.0    
λ23 -0.5    
λ24 -0.5    
λ30 0.475459    
λ31 -0.5    
λ32 -0.5    
λ33 1.0    
λ34 -0.5    
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3.7 APPENDIX 3.D: EXOGENOUS VARIABLES VALUES 
Parameter Value 
bot 0.47 
botpm 0.01 
g 157.10 
μ 0.00 
Pe 1.00 
Pr 1.00 
rb 0.03 
rent 0.056 
top 0.51 
toppm 0.01 
W 0.80 
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Chapter 4 
 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial integration has substantially increased in the past two decades not 
just between developed economies but also between developed and emerging 
economies (Anderson and Moreno 2005).  Two countries or markets are said to be 
financially integrated if, as Baele et al (2004) defined, all potential participants with 
the same relevant characteristics: 
1- Face the same set of rules when they decide to deal with financial instruments 
and/ or services; 
2- Have equal access to those financial instruments and/ or services; 
3- Are treated equally when they are active in the market. 
Perhaps because of the multifaceted nature of the issue of financial 
integration, opinions differ on what it is, and how it should be measured.  Some 
authors aver that if assets generating identical cash flows command the same return, 
then two or more markets can be considered financially integrated. 
Financial integration can be measured in several ways for different markets; 
the most important measures are: price-based measures, yield-based measures, news-
based measures, and quantity-based measures in money market, credit market, 
corporate bond market, government bond market, and equity market. 
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Economists use some statistical measures—like spread, dispersion, change—to 
see how prices, yields, news, and quantities are close within each market.  Figure 4.1 
shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of the overnight lending rates among 
Euro countries money market. 
Figure 4.1 shows how the dispersion of the overnight lending rate of all 
European countries declined to be close to zero after 1998.  This means that, after the 
European monetary union and issuing the single European currency (Euro), the 
overnight lending rates of all Euro countries become very close to each other. 
Figure 4.2 shows the average yield spread for 10-year government bond of 10 
European countries relative to Germany.  The figure shows a convergence in the 10-
year average government bonds of the selected European countries. 
Figure 4.1: Cross-sectional standard deviation of the average overnight lending rates among Euro area 
countries 1995-2008 
 
Source: ECB. 
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Figure 4.2: Average yield spread for 10-year government bonds relative to Germany 1993-2002 
 
Source: Baele et al (2004). 
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countries have not required net capital inflows in order to grow (Prasad et al, 2007 
and Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). 
Several authors emphasize the important role of financial integration by 
contributing to economic growth through removing frictions and barriers to 
exchange (Baele et al 2004).  The argument for financial integration avers that 
increasing financial markets integration improve the quality of macroeconomic 
management in emerging markets, that increased financial integration results in 
increased economic growth, decreased volatility, and smoothed inter-temporal 
consumption (Anderson and Moreno, 2005). 
Baele et al (2004) suggest further benefits of financial integration: more 
opportunities of risk sharing, risk diversification and smooth consumption.  Kalemli-
Ozcan et al (2003) provide empirical evidence that sharing risk across countries 
improve specialization in production, which result in well-known benefits for the 
economy.  Financially integrated markets provide more financial instruments, and 
thus diversify portfolios and share risk across countries or regions. 
Theoretical models of risk sharing show that sharing risk will lead to a 
convergence in consumption in the financially integrated countries.  Adjaoute and 
Danthine (2003) find that consumption growth rates in the Euro area are less 
correlated than are GDP growth rates. 
Another benefit of financial integration is that financial integration allows for 
better allocation of capital among competing investment opportunities.  The 
complete elimination of trade barriers allow firms to choose the most efficient 
trading, investors can invest anywhere they believe these funds will gain more. 
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Another implication of greater financial integration is additional economic 
growth.  Financial integration increases risk sharing, allows for more capital 
allocation, and more funds flowing, which lead to more investment opportunities, 
more efficient use of resources, decreasing costs, and enhancing production, and thus 
more economic growth.  Baele et al (2004) argue that financial integration increases 
competition within less developed regions, which improves the efficiency of their 
financial systems, decreasing the intermediation costs, and increasing production. 
Financial integration can expose countries, and particularly those with small 
open economies, to external shocks, which may reduce any potential growth and 
consumption smoothing benefits from a process of integration.  The issue of 
uncertain returns in emerging markets leading to flows of capital from emerging 
markets to developed markets (Reinhart et al, 2003 and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
has not been resolved in the literature.  Mendoza et al 2009 claim that when countries 
differ in the level of development of their financial markets, then financial integration 
can be the cause of the global financial imbalances8. 
Baele et al (2004) claim that financial integration is insufficient to produce the 
most efficient outcome unless markets are complete.  Hart (1975) shows in his 
analysis that expanding the set of financial instruments when markets are incomplete 
is beneficial, if the new instruments bring hedging opportunities. 
Anderson and Moreno (2005) provide some factors that may account for the 
negative effects of financial integration.   
                                                          
8
 Kose et al (2006), for example, emphasize financial integration is beneficial for economic performance 
if only a threshold of financial development is attained.  Quality of institutions and macroeconomic 
policies are therefore key variables in increasing the impact of financial integration on welfare, per 
capita output, and capital inflows (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001, Lane 2004, Gourinchas and 
Jeanne 2008, and Alfaro et al 2008). 
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First, financial integration, as gauged by measures of financial integration, has 
been uneven.  Financial integration involves some well-known trade-offs.  Gross 
capital flows declined in the emerging markets after 1996 after the rise in these flows 
at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 A second factor that may account for the negative effect of financial 
integration is that net capital has flowed from poor to rich countries.  Against what 
theory predicts, there has been a net transfer of resources from developing to 
developed countries.  One reason may stand behind this is that returns in emerging 
market countries are still highly uncertain in many asset classes. 
Third, external shocks may dominate consumption smoothing effects. 
Empirical evidences show that external shocks, like terms of trade changes, are more 
important in developing countries than in the developed one.  Some evidences show 
that markets should reach a certain level of development and proper institutions 
before reducing the vulnerability to external shocks.  Most emerging markets are still 
below that level. 
Several studies explore the degree of financial integration within the same 
country markets and between countries using the co-integration analysis.  Voronkova 
(2004) shows that central Europe has become more integrated with global markets 
than reported previously.  Yang et al (2003) examine the long-run co-integration 
relationship and short-run dynamic causal linkages among the US, Japanese, and ten 
Asian emerging stock markets.  Results of this study show that the long-run co-
integration relationships and short-run causal linkages among these markets were 
strengthened during the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998 and become more integrated 
after the crisis.  While several other co-integration studies show that stock market 
integration is affected by the financial crisis as Yang et al (2003) claim. 
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Ibrahim (2009) investigates the progress of ASEAN+3 financial markets 
integration after the 1997 Asian financial crisis using co-integration test on credit and 
stock markets as indicators. The results show no significant improvement in the 
intraregional financial integration after the crisis. 
Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) have built a general equilibrium model that 
examines how greater integration of world financial markets affects the behavior of 
international capital flows and financial returns.  They consider two symmetric 
countries with production of traded and non-traded goods.  Evans and Hnatkovska 
assume that asset prices and relative goods prices clear markets, given the state of 
productivity, optimal investment, consumption, saving, and portfolio decisions.  
Their results suggest that at the early stages of financial integration international 
capital flows are large and volatile. The size and volatility falls dramatically when 
households gain access to foreign equity markets.  The model finds that global risk 
factors become important as integration rises and equity prices can be used as a 
reliable measure of financial integration. 
Pang (2008) analyzes the welfare impact of financial integration in a standard 
monetary open economy model with nominal price rigidity.  Results show that terms 
of trade become more volatile when international consumption risk-sharing 
increases. 
Several studies show that ignoring the possibility of structural change can 
affect the power of co-integration tests and the relevance of their conclusion about 
the presence of co-integration.  Co-integration results differ among studies depending 
on data used for analysis and specifications used to determine the co-integration 
relationships.  Co-integration studies are used to analyze specific market and cannot 
cover all markets, while stock flow consistent models have the ability to cover all 
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markets, like money, credit, bonds, and equity markets within the same country and 
between countries. 
The growth in cross-border investment positions in recent years has prompted 
a multi-layered global debate about the macroeconomic impact of increased financial 
integration.  
Another measure of financial integration is the index built by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001a and 2007a).  This index is a volume-based measure of international 
financial integration: 
    
  
   
     
 
    
 
 
where;     
  is the index for country i at time t,    
  is foreign assets held,    
  is foreign 
liabilities held, and     
  is gross domestic product. 
This measure has two advantages: first, it is the financial analogue to 
measuring trade openness by the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP, and so is 
easily interpreted.  Second, the measure is well established in the literature, and so 
the results of our simulations can be compared with other studies such as Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007a, 2007b). 
This chapter is organized as follows. Model's balance sheets and transactions 
and flows matrix, a description of the model equations and identities for both 
economies, and simulation experiments are presented in section 2.  Section 3 
concludes. 
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4.2 THE MODEL 
This chapter contribution is exploring financial integration using the stock 
flow consistent approach grounded in Godley and Lavoie (2007).  The model 
deployed in this chapter describes two steady state economies, each economy 
compound of five sectors: households, firms (non-financial sector), government, 
central bank, and private banks.  Each sector is assumed to acquire assets (+) and 
have liabilities (-). 
The model assumes that one country is small in terms of its gross national 
product, and the other is large.  In this chapter, the aim of simulation experiments is 
to explore the effect of some policies and agreements on the degree of financial 
integration in both countries.  There are several ways of measuring financial 
integration directly or indirectly.  Some are based on checking the number of existing 
frictions and barriers to the intermediation process, so the more symmetric frictions 
and barriers are the higher the degree of financial integration.  Others concentrate on 
the prices of assets in each economy, so the closer these relative prices are (or the 
smaller their coefficient of dispersion are) the more the degree of financial integration 
measured (Flood and Rose 2004, Pagano 2002). 
4.2.1 MODEL MATRICES 
Table 4.1 provides the balance sheet matrix of the model.  The matrix contains 
five sectors in each economy.  These sectors are assumed to acquire assets (+) and 
liabilities (-).  The superscript 1 refers to the first country and 2 refers to the second 
one.  The subscript h refers to households, f to firms, b to banks, cb to the central 
bank, d for demand, and s for supply.  All columns and rows in the matrix sum to zero 
apart from the fixed capital, which is an asset that has no counterpart liability. 
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Households are assumed to acquire high-powered money (+Hjh d), where j = 1 
for country one and 2 for country two.  They are assumed to have money deposits in 
banks (+Mjd).  Households in both countries are assumed to acquire domestic (+B
j
h j d) 
and foreign (+Bzh j d) government securities, where z = 1 for country one and 2 for 
country two and z ≠ j—in this model, treasury bills are taken as a proxy of the 
government securities.  Households are also assumed to acquire firm equities (+ej.pje), 
where e is the number of equities and pe is the price of the equity.  The sum of 
households’ assets gives the households wealth (-Vjh).  Households’ wealth has a (-) 
sign to guarantee that the sum of households’ sector column equals zero. 
Firms are assumed to have fixed capital (+Kj) and take loans from banks (-Ljf d) 
and supply equities to households.  The sum of these assets and liabilities gives the 
net worth of firms’ sector (-NWjf).  Each government is assumed to supply treasury 
bills (-Bjs) to domestic and foreign households, domestic banks, and its central bank.  
The second country government is assumed to supply treasury bills to the first 
country central bank.  Due to the assumption that the first country is small, it is 
assumed that the second country central bank do not hold treasury bills from the first 
country.  The stock of treasury bills supplied by the government is equal to its debt 
(net worth of government (-NWjg)). 
The central bank assets are its holdings of domestic (+Bjcb j d) and foreign bills 
(+Bzcb j d).  Theses foreign bills are assumed to be constant due to the assumption of 
floating exchange rate.  The main role of the central banks is to supply money (+Hjs), 
which are considered as a liability for the central bank. 
Banks’ assets are loans, vault cash (+Hjb d), and domestic bills (+B
j
b d), while 
deposits are their counterpart liabilities.  Banks' net worth is assumed to equal zero in 
this model. 
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Table 4.1: Balance Sheets Matrix of Both Countries 
 Country 1 Ex. 
Rate 
Country 2 
Sum 
 Households Firms Gov. C. Bank Banks Households Firms Gov. C. Bank Banks 
Fixed 
Capital 
 +K
1 
   1/E1  +K
2 
   ΣK 
HPM +H
1
h d   -H
1
s +H
1
b d  +H
2
h d   -H
2
s +H
2
b d 0 
Loans  -L
1
f 
 
d   +L
1
f  s   -L
2
f  d   +L
2
f  s 0 
Deposits +M
1
d    -M
1
s  +M
2
d    -M
2
s 0 
Bills
1 
+B
1
h 1 d  -B
1
s +B
1
cb 1 d +B
1
b 1 d 1/E1 +B
1
h 2 d
 
    0 
Bills
2 
+B
2
h 1 d   +B
2
cb 1 d  1/E1 +B
2
h 2 d  -B
2
s +B
2
cb 2 d +B
2
b 2 d 0 
Equities +e
1
.Pe
1 
-e
1
.Pe
1
     +e
2
.Pe
2
 -e
2
.Pe
2
    0 
Balance -V
1
h -NW
1
f -NW
1
g   1/E1 -V
2
h -NW
2
f -NW
2
g   -ΣK 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.2 describes the transactions and flows between all economic sectors of 
the two economies.  As with the balance sheets matrix, shown in table 4.1, all rows 
and columns must sum up to zero.  Each country's transactions are measured in its 
currency.  Sources of funds are in (+) signs and uses of funds are in (-) signs. 
As shown in the current account column of the firms, households 
consumption (+Cj), government expenditure (+Gj), investment (+Ij), and exports (+Xj) 
are used to finance wages (-WBj), taxes (-Tjf), imports (-IM
j), interests on loans taken 
from banks (-rjl-1.L
j
f d-1), and profits (-F
j
f), these profits are transferred entirely to 
households.  Firms take loans and issue equities to finance their investments, as 
shown in the firms' capital account column. 
Households receive wages, profits, and interest on their holdings of financial 
assets.  Households use these flows to cover for consumption and to pay taxes (-Tjh) 
on their income.  The residual, savings (-∆Vjh), is used to acquire more financial 
assets.  Both governments collect taxes from households and firms, and take all the 
central bank's profits (+Fjcb) to finance the governmental expenses.  The difference 
between the government's inflows and outflows determines the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR). 
Both central banks receive profits in the form of interest payments on their 
holdings of domestic (+rjb-1.B
j
cb j d-1) and foreign (+r
z
b-1.B
z
cb j d-1) assets, and they transfer 
these profits to the government.  The change in their holdings of assets determines 
the quantity of money they have to supply in any period.  Banks generate profits (-Fjb) 
from the difference between their ingoing and outgoing interests.  Change in deposits 
determine how much banks can give in loans and acquire in assets. 
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Table 4.2: Transactions Flows Matrix of Both Countries 
Country 1 Households 
Firms 
Gov. 
Central Banks Banks 
Ex. Rate 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption -C
1
d +C
1
s        
Gov. Expenditure  +G
1
s  -G
1
d      
Investment  +I
1
 -I
1
       
Exports  +X
1
       1/E1 
Imports  -IM
1
       1/E1 
Taxes -T
1
h -T
1
f  +T
1 
     
Wages +WB
1 
-WB
1 
       
Entrepreneurial 
Profits 
+F
1
f -F
1
f        
Bank Profits +F
1
b      -F
1
b   
CB Profit 
 
  +F
1
cb -F
1
cb 
  
  
Interest on          
Loans  -r
1
l-1.L
1
f d-1     +r
1
l-1.L
1
f s-1 
  
Deposits +r
1
m-1.M
1
d-1      -r
1
m-1.M
1
s-1   
Bills
1 
+r
1
b-1.B
1
 h 1 d-1   -r
1
b.B
1
s-1 +r
1
b-1.B
1
cb 1 d-1  +r
1
b-1.B
1
b 1 d-1  1/E1 
Bills
2 
+r
2
b-1.B
2
 h 1 d-1    +r
2
b-1.B
2
cb 1 d-1
 
 
 
 1/E1 
∆ in the  stocks 
of 
         
Loans   +∆L
1
f 1
 
d     -∆L
1
f 1 s  
HPM -∆H
1
h d     +∆H
1
s  -∆H
1
b d  
Deposits -∆M
1
d       +∆M
1
d  
Bills
1 
-∆B
1
1 d   +∆B
1
s  -∆B
1
cb 1 d  -∆B
1
b 1 d 1/E1 
Bills
2 
-∆B
2
h 1 d
 
   
 
-∆B
2
cb 1 d
   
1/E1 
Equities -∆e
1
d
 
.Pe
1 
 +∆e
1
d
 
.Pe
1
  
     
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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Table 4.2: Transactions Flows Matrix of Both Countries (continued) 
Country 2 
Household
s 
Firms 
Gov. 
Central Banks Banks 
Σ 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption -C
2
d +C
2
s       0 
Gov. Expenditure  +G
2
s  -G
2
d     0 
Investment  +I
2 
-I
2 
     0 
Exports  +X
2
       0 
Imports  -IM
2
       0 
Taxes -T
2
h -T
2
f  +T
2 
    0 
Wages +WB
2 
-WB
2 
      0 
Entrepreneurial 
Profits 
+F
2
f -F
2
f       0 
Bank Profits +F
2
b      -F
2
b  0 
CB Profit 
 
  +F
2
cb -F
2
cb 
  
 0 
Interest on         0 
Loans  -r
2
l-1.L
2
f d-1     +r
2
l-1.L
2
f s-1 
 
0 
Deposits +r
2
m-1.M
2
d-1      -r
2
m-1.M
2
s-1  0 
Bills
1 
+r
1
b-1.B
1
 h 2 d-1        0 
Bills
2 
+r
2
b-1.B
2
 h 2 d-1
 
  -r
2
b.B
2
s-1 +r
2
b-1.B
2
cb 2 d-1
 
 +r
2
b-1.B
2
b 2 d-1
 
 0 
∆ in the  stocks of         0 
Loans   +∆L
2
f 2 d     -∆L
2
f 2 s 0 
HPM -∆H
2
h d     +∆H
2
s  -∆H
2
b d 0 
Deposits -∆M
2
d       +∆M
2
d 0 
Bills
1 
-∆B
1
h 2 d        0 
Bills
2 
-∆B
2
h 2 d
 
  +∆B
2
s 
 
-∆B
2
cb 2 d
  
-∆B
2
b 2 d
 
0 
Equities -∆e
2 
d .Pe
2 
 +∆e
2
d 
 
.Pe
2
  
    
0 
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The assumption of no private holdings of foreign cash money implies that all 
transactions of foreign currency by trade of goods or assets are simultaneously 
exchanged by the central bank into domestic currency. 
4.2.2 MODEL EQUATIONS 
In this subsection, a general description of model equations and identities are 
introduced.  Detailed equations and identities can be found in appendix 4.A.  Most of 
model equations are taken from Godley and Lavoie (2007).  These equations and 
identities describe the balance sheets and transactions flows constraints, the 
behavior, and the decisions taken in each economic sector for both countries.  The 
uppercase variables are in nominal values and the lowercase variables are in real 
terms. 
Firms’ nominal output, GDP, equal to the values of consumption, government 
expenditure, investment, exports, and imports. 
                   
Firm’s real sales are the sum of real households’ consumption, real government 
expenditure, real investment, and real exports. 
               
Real output is the sum of real consumption, real government expenditure, real 
investment, real exports minus real imports.  The equation can be written in the 
following form. 
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In this model five prices are considered in each country: sales price, domestic 
sales price, export prices, import prices, and domestic price deflator (or GDP 
deflator).  These prices are interconnected, such that import prices affect volumes 
and values of exports and imports, which affect the price of sales, domestic sales price 
and GDP deflator, which in turn affects volume of imports and exports.  This 
subsection will show how each price will be formed. 
At any period t, the price level of sales is a mark up, φj, on costs.  All profits 
earned by firms as a result of the mark up are assumed to be transferred to 
households as they are considered the owners of firms.  Firm’s costs are the wages 
they pay for workers, the value of imported commodities, and the tax on those 
imports, which transferred to the government.  The government assigns an import tax 
rate on the total value of imports (τim = 10.7%), see appendix 4.A.  Thus, these taxes 
considered as a cost for firms and enter the sales price equation.  Any change in the 
tax rate will be reflected directly on sales prices. 
  
  
                   
  
  
 
Price of domestic sales is determined by the value of sales minus the value of 
exports over the volume of sales minus the volume of exports. 
   
  
       
       
 
Firms’ real investment decision is a function of the difference between the 
actual and target real fixed capital plus depreciation allowance of fixed capital. 
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Firms are assumed to ask for loans and issue equities to cover their 
investments.  Thus, new loans, that firms demand, are equal to the value of net 
investment minus the new equities issued. 
     
       
     
     
    
 
 
The following equations describe the trade flows between the two countries 
and their relevant prices.  The following equations describe the import and export 
price levels in the first country.  Import price is determined by the exchange rate, 
domestic and foreign prices.  It shows that if the domestic currency appreciates with 
respect to the other country's currency then import prices decline.  Import price 
increases with the increase in domestic price deflator and foreign price deflator.  Bold 
characters are in logs. 
  
                
       
  
Exports price level can be determined on the same way as imports price 
equation. 
  
                
       
  
Domestic price deflator (GDP deflator) equals the value of domestic output 
over the volume of output. 
  
  
  
  
 
In this model, it is assumed that there are no transactions costs for trade, and 
thus import and export prices of the second country can be determined by the export 
and import prices of the first country multiplied by the exchange rate. 
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In this model, the exchange rate can be determined through capital flows 
between the two countries.  This model assumes a floating exchange rate. 
    
      
 
      
  
Imports’ volume in the first country responds with elasticities: μj1 with respect 
to import prices relative to domestic prices—valued in domestic currency—and μj2 
with domestic real output. 
               
      
       
  
Exports’ volume can be found in the same way, but respond with elasticities: εj1 
with respect to the other country’s import prices relative to foreign prices and εj2 with 
respect to the other country real output. 
              
      
       
  
The volume of imports and exports of the second country is equal to the 
volume of exports and imports of the first country, thus: 
       
       
Values of exports and imports are equal to relevant volumes multiplied by the 
respective price. 
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The following equations describe current and capital accounts of each country.  
The current account balance is the difference between the values of exports and 
imports plus the net current transfers, which in this model is the difference between 
ingoing and outgoing interests on treasury bills acquired in the two countries. 
                
          
      
           
      
          
      
           
 
 
The capital account balance in this model is the net change of treasury bills in 
each country. 
            
          
         
          
  
Households’ disposable income YDj, as given in the following equation, is 
equal to the personal income YPj minus income tax plus capital gains CGj. 
          
                     
where personal income is the sum of wages, profits from firms and banks, and interest 
inflows on deposits and domestic and foreign treasury bills. 
               
      
      
          
      
          
  
The difference between disposable income and consumption equals savings as 
shown in the following equation. 
           
Households’ real consumption decision depends upon their real disposable 
income and real wealth, as given in the following equation. 
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Households are assumed to manage their portfolios based on Tobin’s portfolio 
decision.  Demand for financial assets as a share of wealth net of cash money (Vjnc) 
depends upon the rate of return on those assets, see equations 4.82 – 4.89 in appendix 
4.A.  Cash money is assumed to be a portion of households’ consumption. 
The government in each country is assumed to supply treasury bills, design the 
fiscal policy, and set the interest rate on treasury bills, which is under its control.  The 
difference between government expenditure and revenues is the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR). 
             
      
         
   
Both governments are assumed to cover their borrowing by issuing new 
treasury bills. 
    
         
Governments, in this model, supply treasury bills to fulfill domestic and 
foreign demands.  The first country government is assumed to supply treasury bills to 
domestic and foreign households and domestic banks.  The rest goes to the domestic 
central bank.  The second country government is assumed to supply bills to domestic 
and foreign households, domestic banks and the foreign central bank.  The rest goes 
to the domestic central bank. 
Central banks supply high-powered money to households and banks.  High-
powered money is assumed not to be purchased outside the country.  The following 
equation describes the supply of high-powered money, which depends upon the 
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change in domestic and foreign bills acquired by the domestic and foreign central 
bank.  Change in the foreign bills is equal to zero, which can be ignored due to the 
assumption of floating exchange rate. 
   
          
          
  
Banks’ profits, which transferred totally to households, are the difference 
between the ingoing and outgoing interests.  Banks are assumed to supply loans to 
firms and accept deposits from households on demand.  Banks budget constraint as 
shown in its balance sheet, determines the demand for treasury bills. 
    
    
      
      
 
 
Banks are assumed to set interest rates on deposits and loans.  Interest rate on 
deposits depends upon two factors, treasury bills interest rate and their liquidity 
position.  Beside the treasury bills interest rate, bank’s profit margin affect the interest 
rate on loans, see appendix 4.A for more details. 
The redundant, or the hidden, equation in this model is that the central bank 
in each country supplies vault cash to banks on demand. 
    
      
 
 
The above equation can be derived from equation 4.115 or 4.116.  The derivation 
of this equation is not an easy task due to that fact that the model is open economy 
model and contains a high number of equations.  But with simulation the equation 
can be checked. 
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4.2.3 MODEL SIMULATIONS 
The baseline scenario assumes two open countries that trade goods, services, 
and some financial assets.  Both countries are in a steady state condition. 
The first scenario (free trade) 
The first scenario assumes that the two governments sign a free trade 
agreement, and the tax rate on imports becomes zero.  In order to neutralize the 
effect of the government deficit, due to the decline in import taxes, on the economy, 
it is assumed that both governments increase the income tax levied on households 
such that the increase in income tax revenues offset the decline in import tax 
revenue.  Eliminating import taxes leads to a decline in price of sales in both 
countries, see equations 4.15 and 4.16.  Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of sales prices in 
both countries. 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of sales prices in both countries after freeing trade 
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The decline in sales prices leads to an increase in the volume of imports and 
exports in both countries see equations 4.50 – 4.53.  On the other hand, the decline in 
exports and sales prices lead to a decline in domestic sales prices, which will lead to 
an increase in real disposable income, real wealth, and thus real households’ 
consumption.  Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the evolution of real households’ 
consumption, real disposable income, and real wealth after freeing trade in both 
countries. 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of real consumption, real disposable income, and real wealth in the first country 
after freeing trade 
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Figure 4.6: Evolution of real consumption, real disposable income, and real wealth in the second country 
after freeing trade 
 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the evolution of the real output in the first and in the 
second country after freeing trade. 
Figure 4.7: Evolution of the first country real output after freeing trade 
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Figure 4.8: Evolution of the second country real output after freeing trade 
 
As shown in figure 4.7, real output increases to higher levels after freeing trade 
but several periods after it starts to decline, while in the second country real output 
continue increasing after freeing trade. 
One main reason may stand behind the decline in the real output in the first 
country and the continuous increase in the real output in the second country is the 
trade balance in each country. 
Figure 4.9 show the evolution of trade balance in both countries.  Immediately 
after freeing trade, the first country enjoys a trade surplus while the second enjoys a 
trade deficit.  But several periods later the second country enjoys a trade surplus while 
the first country enjoys deficit in its trade balance. 
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Figure 4.9: Evolution of trade balances after freeing trade in both countries 
 
On the other hand, the trade deficit in the first country with the decline in 
prices lead to a decline in firms’ profits and wages, which lead to a decline in 
households disposable income and thus consumption.  This effect will lead to a 
decline in the real output of the first country.  Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the evolution 
of households’ portfolio distribution in both countries after freeing trade. 
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of the first country households’ portfolio after freeing trade 
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of the second country households’ portfolio after freeing trade 
  
  
The effect of the decline in prices leads to a decline in the value of households’ 
wealth, which in turn lead to a decline in their demand for financial assets.  
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Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the evolution of the current account balance (CAB), 
capital account balance (KAB), and the government budget balance (GBB) in both 
countries after freeing trade.  As shown in the figure, the first country enjoys a surplus 
in the CAB at the beginning but later it enjoys a deficit.  KAB is almost equals zero.  
The second country enjoys deficits in CAB at the beginning but later it enjoys a 
surplus in its CAB.  KAB as in the first country is equal to zero.  The decline in 
government supply of treasury bills, following the decline in demand, leads to a 
government budget surplus in both countries.  As shown in figure 4.12, it looks that 
CAB and GBB converging towards zero in the long-run, but due to the increase in the 
exchange rate the second country need more time for its CAB and GBB to converge 
towards zero.  Figure 4.14 shows the evolution of the exchange rate after freeing trade. 
Figure 4.12: Evolution of CAB, KAB, and GBB in the first country after freeing trade 
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of CAB, KAB, and GBB in the second country after freeing trade 
 
Figure 4.14: Evolution of the exchange rate after freeing trade 
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The second scenario (asymmetric treasury bills interest rates) 
The second scenario assumes that both countries set the interest rate on 
treasury bills at different rates.  Treasury bills rate in the first country is equal to 3.5 
percent and in the second country is equal to 3.0 percent. Moving to interest rate 
parity, both bills rate are equal to 3.0 percent.  In this model, the price of each 
Treasury bill issued by the government is equal to one unit currency of that country, 
one can assume that the prices are different and then equalize them to see the effect 
on financial integration. 
Figure 4.15: Evolution of both countries households’ demand for foreign treasury bills in the case of 
symmetric treasury bills interest rate compared with asymmetric treasury bills interest rate 
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country treasury bills interest rate.  As shown in the figure, when bills rate in both 
countries is symmetric, then the demand for foreign assets converges or the gap 
between both countries demand is less, which is considered as a sign of financially 
integrated markets. 
The third scenario (monetary union) 
One may increase financial integration between countries by entering into a 
monetary union.  This scenario assumes that both countries sign an agreement for 
monetary union and are now using a single currency (the second country currency).  
As a consequence, the value of all assets, liabilities, and stocks in the first country are 
valued in terms of the second country's currency9.  It is worth noting that this 
scenario assumes also a free trade agreement between both countries as in the first 
scenario and symmetric treasury bills interest rate. 
Following this scenario, the two countries now have one central bank which 
accepts treasury bills from both governments, issues currency to both countries based 
on their demand, and transfers its profits to both governments based on returns 
generated from its holdings of each country's assets (treasury bills). 
Figure 4.12 shows the evolution of real output (real GDP) in the first country 
when it is in free trade and in a monetary union. 
As shown in the figure, monetary union has a positive effect on the output of 
the first country, compared with the case of free trade only, in the short- and long-
runs.  The reason might stand behind this is the elimination of the effect of exchange 
rate, which affects the current account and trade balances in both countries. 
                                                          
9
 For example, if each unit of the first country currency was equal to 1.18 units of the second country currency, 
all val 
ues in the first country will increase by 1.18. 
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As shown in 4.13 trade balances in both countries have changed after the 
monetary union in favor of the first country (the small one). 
Figure 4.12: Evolution of real output in the first country in the cases of free trade and monetary union 
 
Figure 4.13: Evolution of trade balance in both countries after the monetary union 
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Figure 4.14 shows the evolution of the real output in cases of free trade and 
monetary union.  The figure shows that monetary union is less beneficial for the 
second country than the case of free trade.  This is due, as mention above, to the 
change in the trade balances in both countries after the monetary union. 
Figure 4.14: Evolution of real output in the second country in the cases of free trade and monetary union 
 
Figure 4.15: Index of financial integration in the first country in the cases of free trade and monetary 
union 
 
375
380
385
390
395
400
405
410
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
R
ea
l 
V
a
lu
e
Periods
Free trade Monetary union
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
R
a
ti
o
Periods
Free trade Monetary union
CHAPTER 4 – FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
 
101 
 
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s index of financial 
integration for both countries in the cases of free trade and monetary union.  As 
shown in figure 4.15, the first country become more financially integrated in the case 
of monetary union compared with the case of free trade only, while figure 4.16 shows 
that the second country is more financially integrated in the case of free trade only 
compared with the case of monetary union.    
Figure 4.16: Index of financial integration in the second country in the cases of free trade and monetary 
union 
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explore several policies, and agreements, which can be taken in order to enhance 
financial integration, and thus to contribute both to the emerging literature on stock-
flow consistent modeling, as well as the current debate on the costs and benefits of 
ever-closer financial and economic integration amongst the world's economies. 
This chapter shows that freeing trade by eliminating trade barriers initially 
leads to higher levels of output, income and wealth, and its components for both 
countries.  Converging asset prices or rates of return on these assets do lead to a 
significant change in output, income, and wealth, but this converging trend does 
change the households’ portfolio allocation and converge the demand for these assets. 
Monetary union, considered as an advanced level of financial integration 
between countries, is also modeled.  In this model, monetary union affects the real 
side of the economy.  The effect of monetary union in both real and financial sides of 
the economy can be more with the existing of the proper fiscal or monetary policy 
accompanied the process of monetary union between countries.  Thus, each 
agreement aimed at promoting financial integration between countries should be 
parallel with fiscal and monetary policies that would stimulate economic growth, 
income, wealth, and asset prices convergence.  Relating this finding back to the 
European Union's current problems, a more developed system of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers (or a fiscal algorithm or rule set) would be beneficial to reduce the effect of 
asymmetric shocks to individual countries.  
The volume measure of financial integration used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001a and 2007a) does not reflect the effect of converging asset prices on the process 
of financial integration between countries.  This measure can be an appropriate 
measure in cases such as a certain agreement or in cases of fiscal policies, but it does 
not reflect the picture in cases such as converging asset prices or returns.  In these 
cases, if one wishes to explore the effect of assets prices or returns convergence, it is 
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better to look at the convergence of the demand for foreign assets, as documented 
above.  This model may also be calibrated with real world data to assist policy 
formation. 
Several other points and extensions on the model can be taken in order to 
explore financial integration more widely such as assuming that households can also 
purchase foreign equities, firms can also demand loans from foreign banks.  One can 
explore financial integration between developing and developed countries.  Financial 
integration may also be explored in the case of fixed exchange rate, in order to see the 
effect of financial integration on foreign bills acquired by the central bank. 
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4.4 APPENDIX 4.A: MODEL EQUATIONS 
Production sector equations:  
                   (4.1) 
                   (4.2) 
               (4.3) 
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Trade equations: 
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Households sector equations: 
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Government equations: 
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4.5 APPENDIX 4.B: MODEL CODES 
Before defining the variables, the following notations must take into consideration: 
1- The subscript b refers bank. 
2- The subscript cb refers central bank. 
3- The subscript d refers to demand. 
4- The superscript e refers expected value or volume. 
5- The subscript f = firms. 
6- The subscript h = households. 
7- The superscript or subscript j = 1 for country one and 2 for country two. 
8- The subscript l refers loans. 
9- The subscript m refers deposits. 
10- The superscript T refers target value or volume. 
11- The superscript z = 1 for country one and 2 for country 2, such that z ≠ j. 
 
B Government security (treasury bills) e.g. B
j
h z d is country z households demand for country j 
treasury bills 
BLR
j 
Bank liquidity ratio 
BPM
j 
Bank profit margin 
C
j 
Nominal consumption 
c
j 
Real consumption 
CAB
 
Capital account balance 
CG
 
Capital gains 
e
j 
Number of equities 
E1 Exchange rate, how much units of the second country currency per one unit of the first country 
currency. 
F
j
b Bank profits 
F
j
cb Central bank profits 
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F
j
f Firms profits 
G
j 
Nominal government expenditure 
g
j 
Real government expenditure 
H
j
s High powered money supplied by the central bank 
H
j
b Vault cash 
H
j
h Households cash money 
I
j 
Nominal investment 
i
j 
Real investment 
K
j 
Nominal fixed capital 
k
j 
Real fixed capital 
KAB
j 
Capital account balance 
L
j
f Firms loans 
M
j 
Bank deposits 
N
j 
Number of employees 
N
j
fe Number of employees in a full employment level 
ωT j Real wages 
p
j
ds Domestic sales prices 
p
j
e Equity price 
p
j
im Import prices 
p
j
s Sales prices 
p
j
x Export prices 
p
j
y GDP deflator 
φj Price mark-up 
πj Price inflation 
pr
j Workers’ productivity 
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PSBR
j 
Public sector borrowing requirement 
r
j
b Treasury bills interest rate 
r
j
k Rate of return on equities 
r
j
l Loans interest rate 
r
i j
m Deposits interest rate 
S
j 
Nominal sales 
s
j 
Real sales 
T
j 
Taxes 
T
j
f Firms taxes (sales tax) 
T
j
h Households taxes (income tax) 
T
j
im Import taxes 
u
j 
Capacity utilization 
V
j 
Nominal wealth 
V
j
nc Wealth net of cash 
v
j 
Real wealth 
W
j 
Wage rate 
WB
j 
Wage bill 
Y
j 
Nominal output or GDP 
y
j 
Real GDP 
YD
j 
Nominal disposable income 
yd
j 
Real disposable income 
yd
ej
 Expected real disposable income 
YP
j 
Value of personal income 
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4.6 APPENDIX 4.C: PARAMETERS VALUES 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
α
1
1 0.7  λ
1
34 -0.5  τ
1
s 0.1304 
α
2
1 0.7  λ
2
34 -0.5  τ
2
s 0.1304 
α
1
2 0.09  λ
1
40 0.3167  θ
1 
0.2 
α
2
2 0.09  λ
2
40 0.2840  θ
2 
0.2 
β
1
1 0.5  λ
1
41 -0.5  ξ
1
b 0.9 
β
1
2 0.5  λ
2
41 -0.5  ξ
2
b 0.9 
β
2
1 0.5  λ
1
42 -0.5  ξ
1
l 0.0001 
β
2
2 0.5  λ
2
42 -0.5  ξ
2
l 0.0001 
δ
1
k 0.1  λ
1
43 -0.5  ξ
1
m 0.0001 
δ
2
k 0.1  λ
2
43 -0.5  ξ
2
m 0.0001 
ε0 -1.281601  λ
1
44 1.5  υ0 0.0 
ε1 1.0  λ
2
44 1.5  υ1 0.5 
ε2 0.7  λ
1
c 0.1  υ2 0.5 
λ
1
20 0.2029  λ
2
c 0.1  υ3 0.5 
λ
2
20 0.0564  μ0 -0.5707  ω0 0.0 
λ
1
21 -0.5  μ1 1.0  ω 1 0.5 
λ
2
21 -0.5  μ02 0.7  ω 2 0.5 
λ
1
22 1.5  Ω
1
0 -2.3844  ω 3 0.5 
λ
2
22 1.5  Ω
2
0 -2.3843    
λ
1
23 -0.5  Ω
1
1 1.0    
λ
2
23 -0.5  Ω
2
1 1.0    
λ
1
24 -0.5  Ω
1
2 2.0    
λ
2
24 -0.5  Ω
2
2 2.0    
λ
1
30 0.0916  Ω
1
3 0.5    
λ
2
30 0.2599  Ω
2
3 0.5    
λ
1
31 -0.5      
  0.3054    
λ
2
31 -0.5      
  0.3523    
λ
1
32 -0.5  ρ
1 
0.12    
λ
2
32 -0.5  ρ
2 
0.12    
λ
1
33 1.5  τ
1
im 0.1071    
λ
2
33 1.5  τ
2
im 0.1071    
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4.7 APPENDIX 4.D: EXOGENOUS VARIABLE VALUES 
Variable Value  Variable Value 
B
2
cb 1 s 7.6464  pr
1 
1.384 
B
2
h 1 s 28.6740  pr
2 
1.384 
bot
1 
0.780  r
1
b 0.030 
bot
2 
0.780  r
2
b 0.030 
botpm
1 
0.004  r
1
k 0.056 
botpm
2 
0.004  r
2
k 0.078 
g
1 
39.886  top
1 
0.900 
g
2 
103.697  top
2 
0.900 
p
1
e 1.000  toppm
1 
0.011 
p
2
e 1.000  toppm
1 
0.011 
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Chapter 5 
 
CREDIT CRUNCH CONTAGION AND EFFECTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A credit crunch, also known as a `credit squeeze’ or `credit crisis’, refers to a 
sudden shortage of funds for lending resulting in a decline in loan lending.  This 
decline is assumed to be independent of a rise in official interest rates (see for 
example Ben Bernanke et al 1991 and Borensztein and Lee 2002).  There are several 
proposed reasons for a credit crunch: 
1- An anticipated decline in the value of collateral; 
2- An exogenous change in monetary conditions, such as a central bank 
suddenly and unexpectedly raising reserve requirements or imposing new 
restrictions on lending activities; 
3- The central government imposing direct credit controls on the banking 
system; or 
4- An increase in risk regarding the solvency in the banking system. 
The recent credit crunch was driven by a sharp increase in default in subprime 
mortgages in US, with the result of this shortage of funds spreading to the rest of the 
world.  Increases in bad debts led to a decline in the banks’ reserves, and also the 
increases in the costs of interbank lending resulted in a decline in loans supplied to 
consumers.  This decline may have led to, or contributed to, a fall in the demand for 
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houses and their prices, and also to a fall in bank profits margins and a decline in the 
share value of banks. 
The inability of banks to meet their short run liabilities led to failures of those 
banks and as a consequence to bankruptcy.  In the recent financial crisis several 
banks in the US, Europe and in the rest of the world failed or were acquired such as 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in the US, Northern Rock and the Bradford and 
Bingley in the UK.  
Figure 5.1 shows non-performing loans (NPLs) as a share of total loans in the 
US in the period 2005-2009.  The figure shows that NPLs increased from below 1.0% 
in 2006 to around 5.4% in 2009 as a share of total loans.  As long as house prices 
increased, when a household could not pay back its mortgage the bank would acquire 
the collateral (the house), which had gone up in value, so that the bank would still 
make a profit.  But when the price of houses dropped, the inability of a home owner 
to pay back their mortgage implied that the bank acquired a house with a lower value, 
and was making a loss. 
Figure 5.1: Non-performing loans to total loans in US 2005-2009.  
 
Source: IMF, World financial stability report, April 2010. 
NPL's/ Total Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
%
CHAPTER 5 – CREDIT CRUNCH CONTAGION AND EFFECTS 
 
119 
 
Figure 5.2 shows total net lending in the US commercial banks in the period 
2005-2009.  As it is shown in the figure, net lending dropped slightly in 2008 
compared with 2007 but sharply in 2009 compared with 2008. 
Figure 5.2: Total net lending in the US commercial banks 2005-2009.  
 
Source: Board of Governance of the Federal Reserve System, US 2010. 
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define credit crunch as a leftward shift in the supply curve of bank loans, holding 
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constant real interest rates and quality of bank borrowers.  They aver that slow 
growth in lending could be a result of weak demand for credit, weak supply, or both. 
Regarding the supply side of credit, Bernanke et al argue that a shortage of banks’ 
equity capital is the most important factor reducing the supply of loans. 
Ben Bernanke et al (1991) refer to two factors which may help understanding 
the slow-down in bank lending.  First is the unavailability of funds.  In order to lend 
banks must have sufficient funds in the form of each bank’s capital or its managed 
liabilities.  The second factor is the upward trend in the securitization of bank loans; 
banks regularly initiate loans with the intention of selling all or part of it to other 
investors.  Loans securitized in this manner do not appear on the banks’ balance sheet 
and thus would not be counted as part of bank loans. 
Ben Bernanke et al claim that cutting back bank lending directly affects bank-
dependent borrowers like small businesses, and indirectly affects the macroeconomy. 
Reducing credit to firms will force them to shed workers and delay or cancel some 
investment, and thus reducing output in the short- and long-runs.  An exogenous 
decline in lending will either cut off bank-dependent borrowers entirely or force them 
to employ more costly forms of credit.  In either case, the net return on investment 
falls, and, as a consequence, the demand for investment falls. 
Borensztein and Lee (2002) analyze the financial crisis and credit crunch in 
Korea in the late 1990s, and found that the allocation of credit had an important effect 
on real output.  Results suggest that the credit crunch may have been the outcome of 
the structural changes in the financial sector, rather than of a general monetary 
contraction.  This suggests that a monetary expansion will do little to eliminate the 
problem.  They claim that weaknesses in the financial institutions and corporate 
borrowers may explain much of the credit contraction that happened in Korea in the 
late 1990s. 
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Furman and Stiglitz (1998) claim that a credit crunch will exacerbate an 
economic downturn.  Liquidity constraints imposed by weakening the financial 
system with stringently enforced capital adequacy standards make it difficult for firms 
to find outside financing, and the low level of profits associated with the economic 
downturn make it difficult to expand investment.   
Ding et al (1998), writing about the credit crunch in East Asia in 1997, find that 
credit crunch negatively affected East Asian economies, particularly small sized banks 
and enterprises.  They claim that reliance on tight monetary policy may be counter-
productive to restore market confidence on those economies. 
Gai and Kapadia (2010) claim that the collapse of the interbank loans market 
has been a central feature of the recent global financial crisis. Because banks are 
afraid about their liquidity position, they become hoarders and stop lending to other 
banks.  Gai and Kapadia claim that highly connected banks, or banks with high 
interbank loans, should be considered the instruments of the credit crunch 
contagion. 
Gui and Kapadia suggest policy measures to target the key institutions or 
“super-spreaders”.  These policies mainly focus on liquidity, “systemic liquidity 
requirements may contribute significantly towards financial stability”.  Other policies 
are suggested, like “promoting greater liquidity self-insurance and more diversified 
funding by banks in the future”.  Results point toward prudential regulations to 
provide a disincentive for banks to increase their liquidity risk in proportion to the 
marginal contribution of any bank to overall systemic risk. 
Whalen (2008) describes the US credit crunch in 2007 as a “Minsky moment”. 
Before July 2007, banks were able to lend to the buyout firms—buyout market is just 
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one dimension of the credit crunch—because they were able to resell these loans to 
other investors.  But in July 2007, “the market of new and existing buyout loans 
shrank rapidly”.  This is because, as Jubak (2007) writes, investors discovered in late 
July that they could not sell their loans at any price, and loans they were holding were 
losing much of their value.  Another dimension of credit crunch is the “commercial 
papers”, which are promises to pay that wide range of companies issue to acquire 
short term funding.  As in the market for buyouts, the commercial paper market was 
“freezing up” by the end of August 2007. 
Another dimension is hedge funds, they were borrowing money to invest in 
mortgages, but when it appeared that large numbers of homeowners could not repay 
their mortgage obligations, hedge funds found themselves sitting on huge losses.  For 
example, in June 2007 two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns were wiped out, for a total 
loss of $20 billion (Foley 2007). 
Whalen (2008) identifies some key elements which may have led to a Minsky 
moment of credit crunch.  The start was with the housing boom which began around 
2000, with lenders enticing less creditworthy home buyers into the market with 
exotic mortgages such as “interest-only” loans and “option adjustable rate” mortgages 
(known also as option ARMs).  These types of loans start with low payments by the 
home-owners, but later these payments increase.  Another key element in the 
creation of a Minsky moment in the US was unregulated mortgages brokers.  Those 
brokers just care about their commission, so they were pushing option ARMs hard 
because they were highly profitable for banks, thus brokers’ commissions were also 
high as Whalen states. 
Another key element that led to a Minsky moment of credit crunch is the 
securitization of mortgages.  This means that banks were bundling dozens of 
mortgages and selling them to investment funds, such as hedge funds, as they were 
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considered to be pros in managing risk.  Whalen (2008: 102) argues that “The 
mortgage bundles, financial derivatives (such as futures and options trading), and other 
investment tools widely used by these investments funds involve a lot more Keynesian 
uncertainty than probabilistic risk”. 
According to Mizen (2008), a number of factors provided the base for the 
credit crunch in the US in 2007.  First, there was a period of economic stability with 
very low long-term interest rates supported by global saving gluts flowing from 
emerging and oil-exporting economies.  The second factor is the financial innovations 
like mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and third, banks introduced more complex, 
higher leverage products with weaker underlying assets based on subprime 
mortgages. 
The fourth factor is the fall in house prices in the US which was unanticipated 
and when that house prices did fall the default in loans increased mainly in the 
subprime sector which provide a trigger for the crisis.  This crisis spread to other 
markets like assets and money markets.  Widespread loan default led to several bank 
failures, which then spurred a reaction in the markets for short-term paper as banks 
withdrew from lending in money markets. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: following the introduction, 
section 2 contains the main model features are presented, after that, matrices and 
equations are constructed, and finally model run and simulations are presented.  
Section 3 concludes. 
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5.2 THE MODEL 
This chapter contribution is describing credit crunch using the stock flow 
consistent approach in lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007).  The model deployed in this 
chapter describes two steady state—almost identical—economies with five sectors in 
each economy: households, firms (non-financial sector), government, central bank, 
and private banks.  Each sector is assumed to acquire assets (+) and have liabilities (-).  
The main contribution of this model is that the private bank sector in both economies 
is composed of two representative banks.  The reason behind this assumption is to see 
the contagion of credit crunch from one bank in a specific country to the other banks 
in the domestic country and to foreign banks connected through interbank loans. 
This model assumes that a credit crunch happens due to a decline in the 
supply of loans to the other sectors in the economy, as well as in the supply of 
interbank loans.  The demand for loans and interbank loans is assumed to follow 
supply, in other words, the demand for loans is supply-constrained. 
5.2.1 MODEL MATRICES 
Table 5.1 provides the balance sheet of the model.  The model contains five 
sectors.  The households sector is assumed to acquire high powered money (+Hj h d), 
where j = 1 for country one and 2 for country two, money deposits (+Mi j d) in both 
domestic banks, where i = I for bank I and II for bank II, local (+Bjh j d) and foreign 
(+Bzh j d) government securities (e.g. treasury bills), where z = 1, 2 and z ≠ j, and banks 
equities (+OFi j).  Households are assumed to take loans from their domestic banks (-
Li jh d).  The sum of all households’ assets and liabilities gives the wealth of households 
(Vj). 
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Table 5.1: Balance Sheets Matrix in both economies 
 Country 1 
Ex. 
Rate 
Country 2 
Sum Househol
ds 
Firms Gov. C. 
Bank 
Banks Househol
ds 
Firms Gov. C. 
Bank 
Banks 
I II I II 
Fixed Capital  +K
1 
    E1  +K
2 
    ΣK 
High 
Powered 
Money 
+H
1
h d   -H
1
s +H
I 1
b d +H
II 2
b d  +H
2
h d   -H
2
s +H
I 2
b d +H
II 2
b d 0 
Households 
Loans 
-L
I 1
h d    +L
I 1
h s   -L
I 2
h d    +L
I 2
h s  0 
-L
II 1
h d     +L
 II 1
h s  -L
II 2
h d     +L
II 2
h s 0 
Firm Loans 
 -L
I 1
f d   +L
I 1
f s    -L
I 2
f d   +L
I 2
f s  0 
 -L
II 1
f d    +L
II 1
f s   -L
II 2
f d    +L
II 2
f s 0 
Interbank 
Loans 
    -L
II 1
b I 1 d +L
II 1
b I 1 s      
-L
II 2
b I 2 
d
 +L
II 2
b I 2 s 0 
Intrabank 
loans 
    +L
I 1
b I 2 s -L
II 2
b II 1 d E1     -L
I 1
b I 2 d +L
II 2
b II 1 s 0 
Deposits 
+M
I 1
d    -M
I 1
s   +M
I 2
d    -M
I 2
s  0 
+M
II 1
d     -M
II 1
s  +M
II 2
d     -M
II 2
s 0 
Bills
1 
+B
1
h 1 d  -B
1
s +B
1
cb 1 d +B
I 1
b d +B
II 1
b d E1 +B
1
h 2 d   +B
1
cb 2 d   0 
Bills
2 
+B
2
h 1  d   +B
2
cb 1 d   E1 +B
2
h 2 d  -B
2
s 
+B
2
cb 2 
d 
+B
I 2
b d +B
II 2
b d 0 
Bank Capital +OF
I 1 
   -OF
I 1 
  +OF
I 2 
   -OF
I 2 
 0 
+OF
II 1 
    -OF
II 1 
 +OF
II 2 
    -OF
II 2 
0 
Balance -V
1
 -NW
1
f -NW
1
g    E1 -V
2
 -NW
2
f -NW
2
g    ΣK 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Firms are assumed to own tangible assets—fixed capital (+Kj).  Firms take 
loans from both domestic banks (-Li jf d).  The sum of these assets and liabilities gives 
the net worth of firms (NWjf).  
The government in each country has to finance any deficit by selling securities, 
in this model treasury bills (-Bjs) are considered as a proxy of government securities.  
Both governments in this model are assumed to sell treasury bills to other sectors in 
the local economy and to the households and the central bank of the other country, 
these securities considered to be the net worth of the government (NWjg).  The two 
countries’ central banks are assumed to acquire government securities from the 
domestic government (+Bjcb j d) and the foreign government (+B
z
cb j d).  Central banks 
are assumed to supply high powered money (+Hjs) to households and to private banks 
domestically. 
Private banks in both countries are assumed to hold vault cash (+Hi jb d), 
acquire local government securities (+Bi jb d), supply loans to domestic households (+L
i 
j
h s) and to firms (+L
i j
f s).  Banks accept households money deposits (-M
i j
s) and supply 
equities to households, these equities are considered to be banks’ capital (-OFi j). 
Private banks in this model are assumed to demand and supply interbank 
loans between each other locally and outside.  Bank I in country one creates a 
demand for interbank loans from country one II bank (-LII 1b I 1 d) and supplies 
interbank loans to the second country I bank (+LI 1b I 2 s).  Bank II in country one is 
assumed to create a demand for interbank loans from country two II bank (-LII 2b II 1 d) 
and supply interbank loans to bank I in the first country (+LII 1b I 1 s).  Second country I 
bank is assumed to demand interbank loans from first country I bank (-LI 1b II 1 d) and 
from second country II bank (-LII 2b II 1 d).  Bank II in the second country is assumed to 
supply loans to the first country II bank (+LII 2b II 1 s) and to the second country I bank 
(+LII 2b I 2 s). 
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Table 5.2 is the revaluation matrix, which contains two components, fixed 
capital and bank capital.  Banks accumulate own funds and these funds belong to the 
owners of the banks (households), and thus they are treated as a liability of banks.  
From the standpoint of the bank owners, the own funds accumulated by banks are 
treated as capital gain.  These gains are considered to be part of the households’ 
wealth from a Haig-Simon point of view and as implemented in Godley and Lavoie 
(2007), because if the bank gets liquidated, the bank owners would be left with the 
own funds of the bank.  The value of the firm’s fixed capital revaluated automatically 
from price inflation. 
Table 5.2: Revaluation Matrix in both economies 
 Country 1 Country 2 
Sum 
Households Firms 
Banks 
Households Firms 
Banks 
I II I II 
Fixed 
Capital 
 +∆p
1
.k
1
-1    +∆p
1
.k
1
-1   
∆p
1
.k
1
-1.E1 
+∆p
2
.k
2
-1 
Bank 
Capital 
+∆OF
 I 1
  -∆OF
 I 1
  +∆OF
 I 2
  -∆OF
 I 2
  0 
+∆ OF
 II 1
   -∆ OF
 II 1
 +∆ OF
 II 2
   -∆OF
 II 2
 0 
Table 5.3 describes values of transactions and flows within and between 
economic sectors in both economies in a given period of time.  Variables with (+) sign 
describes the sources of funds and variables with (-) sign describes the uses of funds.  
Each row and column in the transactions flows matrix must sum to zero.  Starting 
from the firms sectors, firms have two accounts: current and capital accounts.  On the 
current account column, firms produce consumption goods and services to 
households (+Cjs) and to government (+G
j
s) and provide net investment to its capital 
account (+Ij). 
Firms pay taxes on sales to the government (-Tjf), wages to households (-WB
j), 
interest on loans provided by the domestic banks (-ri jl-1.L
i j
f d-1), and keep part of their 
funds to cover for the depreciation in the fixed capital (-δjk.K
j), the depreciation 
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allowances go to the firm’s capital account.  The difference between sources and uses 
of funds in the firm’s current account is its profits (-Fjf), which are transferred to 
households as they are considered to be the owners of firms. 
Another source of funds besides the depreciation allowance, which appears in 
the capital account of firms are new loans.  These sources of funds are used to cover 
new investments, which appears in the capital account of firms. 
Households in this model are assumed to earn wages form firms; profits 
transferred to them form the firms sector, dividends from the banking sector (+FDi jb), 
interest on their deposits (+ri jm-1.M
i j
d-1), interest on their holdings of domestic (+r
j
b-
1.B
j
h j d-1) and foreign (+r
z
b-1.B
z
h j d-1) government securities—in this model, treasury bills 
are taken as a proxy of the government securities. 
Households use these sources of funds to pay for their consumption to firms, 
income taxes to the government (-Tjh).  In this model it is assumed that households 
have some loan defaults, or non-performing loans, and they are considered to form 
5.0% of their stock of loans.  What households will pay is the interest on performing 
loans (-ri jl-1 (L
i j
h d-1-NPL
i j
-1)). 
After deducting income tax and interest on loans from all sources of funds 
including capital gains or losses we get disposable income of the households sector 
and after subtracting consumption from the disposable income we have the change in 
households’ wealth level or households’ savings in that particular period of time.  
Change in wealth comes from the change in stocks of all their assets and liabilities. 
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Table 5.3: Transactions Flows Matrix in both economies 
Country 1 Households 
Firms 
Gov. 
Central 
Banks 
Banks Ex. 
Rate I II 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital  
Consumption -C
1
d +C
1
s         
Gov. Expen.  +G
1
s  -G
1
d       
Investment  +I
1
 -I
1
        
Depreciation  -δ
1
k. K
1
 +δ
1
k. K
1 
       
Taxes -T
1
h -T
1
f  +T
1 
      
Wages +WB
1 
-WB
1 
        
Entreprene-
urial Profits 
+F
1
f -F
1
f    
     
Bank Profits 
+FD
1 I
b     -F
I 1
b +FU
I 1
b    
+FD
1 II
b       -F
II 1
b +FU
II 1
b  
CB Profit 
 
  +F
1
cb -F
1
cb 
    
 
Interest on           
Household 
Loans 
-r
I 1
l-1.  
L
I 1
h d-1 
    
+r
I 1
l-1.  
L
I 1
h s-1 
   
 
-r
II 1
l-1. 
 L
II 1
h d-1 
    
  +r
II 1
l-1.  
L
II 1
h s-1 
 
 
Households 
default loans 
+r
I 1
l-1.  
NPL
I 1
-1 
    
-r
I 1
l-1.  
NPL
I 1
-1 
   
 
+r
II 1
l-1.  
NPL
II 1
-1 
    
  -r
II 1
l-1.  
NPL
II 1
 -1 
 
 
Firm Loans  -r
I 1
l-1.L
I 1
f d-1    
+r
I 1
l-1. 
  L
I 1
f s-1 
   
 
  -r
II 1
l-1.L
II 1
f d-1    
  +r
II 1
l-1.  
L
II 1
f s-1 
 
 
Interbank      -r
II 1
lb-1.  +r
II 1
lb-1.  
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Loans  L
II 1
b I 1 d-1  L
II 1
b I 1 s-1 
Intrabank 
Loans 
     
+r
I 1
lb-1. 
 L
I 1
b I 2 s-1 
 -r
2 II
lb-1. 
L
2 II
b II 1 d-1 
 E1 
Deposits 
+r
I 1
m-1.M
I 1
d-1     
-r
I 1
m-1. 
M
I 1
s-1 
    
+r
II 1
m-1.M
II 1
d-1       -r
II 1
m-1.M
II 1
s-1   
Bills
1 
+r
1
b-1. B
1
 h 1 d-1   -r
1
b.B
1
s-1 +r
1
b-1. B
1
cb 1 d-1 
+r
1
b-1.  
B
I 1
b d-1 
 +r
1
b-1.  
B
II 1
b d-1 
 E1 
Bills
2 
+r
2
b-1. B
2
 h 1 d-1    +r
2
b-1. B
2
cb 1 d-1
     E1 
∆ in the  
stocks of 
     
     
Household 
Loans 
+∆L
I 1
h 
 
d      -∆L
I 1
h 
 
s    
+∆L
II 1
h 
 
d        -∆L
II 1
h 
 
s  
Firm Loans 
  +∆L
I 1
f 
 
d    -∆L
I 1
f 
 
s    
  +∆L
II 1
f 
 
d      -∆L
1 II
f 
 
s  
Interbank 
Loans 
     
 +∆L
II 1
b I 1 
 
d 
 -∆L
II 1
b I 1  s 
 
Intrabank 
Loans 
     
 -∆L
I 1
b I 2 s 
 +∆L
II 1
b II 2 
 
d 
 
HPM -∆H
1
h d    +∆H
1
s  -∆H
I 1
b d  -∆H
II 1
b d  
Deposits 
-∆M
I 1
d      +∆M
I 1
d    
-∆M
II 1
d        +∆M
II 1
d  
Bills
1 
-∆B
1
h 1 d   +∆B
1
s -∆B
1
cb 1 d  -∆B
I 1
b d  -∆B
I 1
b d E1 
Bills
2 
-∆B
2
h 1 d
 
   -∆B
2
cb 1 d
     E1 
Default 
Loans 
+NPL
I 1
      -NPL
I 1
    
+NPL
II 1
         -NPL
II 1
  
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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Table 5.3: Transactions Flows Matrix in both economies (Continued) 
Country 2 Households 
Firms 
Gov. 
Central 
Banks 
Banks 
Sum 
I II 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital  
Consumption -C
2
d +C
2
s        0 
Gov. Expen.  +G
2
s  -G
2
d      0 
Investment  +I
2
 -I
2
       0 
Depreciation  -δ
2
k. K
2
 +δ
2
k. K
2 
       
Taxes -T
2
h -T
2
f  +T
2 
     0 
Wages +WB
2 
-WB
1 
       0 
Entreprene-
urial Profits 
+F
2
f -F
2
f    
    0 
Bank Profits 
+FD
I 2
b     -F
I 2
b +FU
I 2
b   0 
+FD
II 2
b       -F
II 2
b +FU
II 2
b 0 
CB Profit 
 
  +F
2
cb -F
2
cb 
    
0 
Interest on           
Household 
Loans 
-r
I 2
l-1.  
L
I 2
h d-1 
    
+r
I 2
l-1. 
 L
I 2
h s-1 
   0 
-r
II 2
l-1 
 L
II 2
h d-1 
    
  +r
II 2
l-1.  
L
II 2
h s-1 
 0 
Households 
default loans 
+r
I 2
l-1.  
NPL
I 2
-1 
    
-r
I 2
l-1.  
NPL
I 2
-1 
   0 
+r
II 2
l-1.  
NPL
II 2
-1 
    
  -r
II 2
l-1.  
NPL
II 2
-1 
 0 
Firm Loans 
 -r
I 2
l-1. L
I 2
f d-1    
+r
I 2
l-1. 
 L
I 2
f s-1 
   0 
 -r
II 2
l-1. L
II 2
f d-1    
  +r
II 2
l-1. 
 L
II 2
f s-1 
 0 
Interbank      -r
II 2
lb-1.   +r
II 2
lb-1.  0 
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Loans L
II 2
b I 2 d-1  L
II 2
b I 2 s-1 
Intrabank 
Loans 
     
-r
I 1
lb-1. 
L
I 1
b I 2 d-1 
 +r
II 2
lb-1. 
L
II 2
b II 1 s-1 
 0 
Deposits 
+r
I 2
m-1.M
I 2
d-1     
-r
I 2
m-1.  
M
I 2
s-1 
   0 
+r
II 2
m-1. M
II 2
d-1       -r
II 2
m-1.M
II 2
s-1  0 
Bills
1 
+r
1
b-1. B
1
 h 2 d-1    +r
1
b-1.B
1
cb 2 d-1     0 
Bills
2 
+r
2
b-1. B
2
 h 2 d-1   -r
2
b.B
2
s-1 +r
2
b-1.B
2
cb 2 d-1
 +r
2
b-1. 
B
I 2
b d-1 
 +r
2
b-1. 
B
II 2
b d-1 
 0 
∆ in the  
stocks of 
     
    0 
Household 
Loans 
+∆L
I 2
h 
 
d      -∆L
I 2
h 
 
s   0 
+∆L
II 2
h 
 
d        -∆L
II 2
h 
 
s 0 
Firm Loans 
  +∆L
I 2
f 
 
d    -∆L
I 2
f 
 
s   0 
  +∆L
II 2
f 
 
d      -∆L
2 II
f 
 
s 0 
Interbank 
Loans 
     
 +∆L
II 2
b I 2 
 
d 
 -∆L
II 2
b I 2 
 
s 
0 
Intrabank 
Loans 
     
 +∆L
I 1
b I 2 d 
 -∆L
II 2
b II 1 
 
s 
0 
HPM -∆H
2
h d    +∆H
1
s  -∆H
I 1
b d  -∆H
II 2
b d 0 
Deposits 
-∆M
I 2
d      +∆M
I 2
d   0 
-∆M
II 2
d        +∆M
II 2
d 0 
Bills
1 
-∆B
1
h 2 d    -∆B
1
cb 2 d     0 
Bills
2 
-∆B
2
h 2 d
 
  +∆B
2
s -∆B
2
cb 2 d
  
-∆B
I 2
b d  -∆B
II 2
b d 0 
Default Loans 
+NPL
I 2
      -NPL
I 2
   0 
+NPL
II 2
        -NPL
II 2
 0 
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The government receives taxes (+Ti) from firms and households and central 
bank’s profits (+Fjcb) and it pays interests on treasury bills supplied to the other 
sectors locally and to the other country (-rjb-1.B
j
s).  The sum of these components 
determines the public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR).  Governments of both 
countries are assumed to cover their PSBR by issuing new treasury bills (+∆Bjs). 
Each Central bank receives interests on their holdings of treasury bills from the 
domestic government (+rjb-1.B
j
cb j d-1) and from the other country’s government (+r
z
b-
1.B
z
cb j d-1).  The sum of these interests is the central bank’s profits, and they are 
transferred completely to the government as shown in the central bank column.  
Central bank is assumed to cover new flows (domestic and foreign bills) by issuing 
high powered money (-∆Hjs) to households and to private banks. 
Private banks, in the current account column, receive interests on loans to 
households and firms, interests on their holdings of treasury bills (+rjb-1.B
i j
b d-1), and 
pay interests to households on money deposits.  As it is assumed in this model, 
households have some default in their loans, and thus banks receive interest just on 
performing loans (+ri jl-1 (L
i j
h d-1-NPL
i j
-1)). 
The main contribution of this model is introducing the interbank loans 
market.  Private banks are assumed to take and give interbank loans.  The following 
diagram shows the interbank loans market in both countries.  The diagram shows 
that bank I of the first country takes interbank loans from bank II of the same country 
and supplies interbank loans to bank I of the second country and bank II also take 
interbank loans from bank II of the second country.  Bank I of the second country is a 
net debtor in this market and take interbank loans from bank II of the same country, 
and thus Bank II of the second country is a net creditor in this market.  Interbank 
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loans market in this model tries to give all possible interactions between banks locally 
and internationally in an attempt to reflect the real world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks have to pay interests on demanded interbank loans and receive interests 
on their supplied interbank loans.  Bank I in country one receive interest on interbank 
loans supplied to bank I of the second country (+rI 1lb-1.L
I 1
b I 2 s-1) and pay interests on its 
demand from bank II of country one (-rII 1lb-1.L
II 1
b I 1 d-1).  Bank II in country one receives 
interests from bank I of the same country (+rII 1lb-1.L
II 1
b I 1 s-1) and pays interests to bank 
II of the second country (-rII 2lb-1.L
II 2
b II 1 d-1).  Regarding the second country, bank I pays 
interests on interbank loans to country one bank I (-rI 1lb-1.L
I 1
b I 2 d-1) and to country two 
bank II (-rII 2lb-1.L
II 2
b I 2 d-1). Bank II of the second country receives interests on 
interbank loans supplied to the first country bank II (+rII 2lb-1.L
II 2
b II 1 s-1) and to the 
second country bank I (+rII 2lb-1.L
II 2
b I 2 s-1). 
Country 1 Country 2 
 
Banking Sector Banking Sector 
Bank I Bank I 
Bank II Bank II 
CHAPTER 5 – CREDIT CRUNCH 
 
135 
 
The difference between the ingoing interests and outgoing interests equals to 
the bank profits (-Fi jb).  Part of these profits goes to households as dividends and the 
rest goes as returned earnings (+FUi jb) to the capital accounts of banks. 
Banks’ capital account contains the change in banks’ assets and liabilities, 
which gives the new flows of bank own funds or bank equities, returned earnings, and 
the value of non-performing loans. 
5.2.2 MODEL EQUATIONS 
This subsection outlines the behavior and motivation of each sector in both 
economies.  The main model equations are going to be described in this subsection.  
All model equations are in appendix 5.A. 
Production firms have to take a complex and interdependent set of decisions 
regarding pricing, investment, employment, and finance.  Firms’ real/ nominal output 
in this model is equal to their real/ nominal sales.  The following equation is the real 
output in each country which is the sum of households’ consumption (cj), 
government expenditure (gj), and investment (ij). 
               
The pricing decision is a constant mark-up of the unit cost, which in turn is 
equal to wages (WBj) paid per each unit of sales.  Investment decision of firms is given 
by the accounting identity of the capital account of firms. 
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The level of investment in a specific period depends upon the flows of loans 
and the value of fixed capital depreciation (see equations 5.19 and 5.20 in appendix 
5.A).  The employment decision depends upon volume of sales and workers 
productivity. In this model, as mentioned above, firms demand for loans is equal to 
banks’ supply of loans to these firms. 
        
         
       
     
 
 
Households’ personal income (YPj) is the sum of wages, profits, and interests 
on their acquired financial assets, see equations 5.33 and 5.34 in appendix 5.A.  
Disposable income (YDj) is equal to the personal income less income tax and interests 
on loans plus the interests on NPL, value of NPL, and capital gains (CGj). 
          
     
      
       
       
        
        
          
      
          
  
          
      
         
       
          
        
        
       
         
         
  
      
        
In this model households in both countries are assumed to be divided into 
three groups.  The three groups are assumed to share the total country disposable 
income.  The first group is assumed to receive 50 percent of the total country 
disposable income.  This group is assumed to consume part of their share of 
disposable income and other part out of their previous level of wealth.  The following 
equation shows the consumption function of the first group of households: 
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where sh1j is the first group share of the total country disposable income and assumed 
to be constant all the time. 
The second group is assumed to consume all their share of the total country 
disposable income plus the new loans they demand from banks. 
                  
The third group is those households who default in their loans and assumed to 
consume just their share of the total country disposable income, see the following 
equation. 
              
 The shares of the second and the third group are assumed to vary over time.  
In this model it is assumed that when a household default in their loan they move 
from the second group to the third group, and thus the share of the third group 
increases when loan defaults increases and vice versa.  The following are the 
equations of the second and third share of the total country disposable income: 
                 
          
       
            
     
     
   
  
where ηj is a constant transforms the second term of the write hand side of the 
equation into percentages.  This equation stats that when total non-performing loans 
in a country out of total loans demand increases the share of the third group increases 
and on the same time the share of the second group decreases by the same 
percentages. 
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Total households’ consumption is the sum of the three groups’ consumption. 
               
Households are assumed to manage their portfolios based on Tobin portfolio 
decision.  Demand for financial assets as a share of financial market assets wealth 
(Vjfma) depends upon the rate of return on those assets, see equations 5.73 – 5.80 in 
appendix 5.A.  Vjfma equals to the value of total wealth minus stocks of cash money, 
loans, and flows of bank equities.  Cash money is assumed to be a potion of 
households’ consumption; households demand for loans is equal to the supply of 
loans to households, and flows of bank equities is determined by the difference 
between bank returned earnings and NPLs. 
The government of each country is assumed to pay for its expenditure and 
transfers (interests on treasury bills supplied for domestic and foreign markets) and 
collects taxes from firms and households in addition to the profits of its central bank.  
The following equation describes PSBR in each country.  Flows of treasury bills 
supplied depend upon the value of PSBR. 
             
      
         
   
    
         
Both governments sell treasury bills to domestic and foreign households, to 
domestic banks, and to the foreign central bank.  The rest are assumed to be sold to 
the domestic central bank as described in the following equation, and thus central 
banks clear the market of treasury bills in both countries.  Given this assumption, 
central banks in this model are not entirely independent from their governments. 
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Regarding central banks in both countries, they are assumed to supply high 
powered money (HPM) to households and banks on demand.  Central banks demand 
for domestic treasury bills depend upon their capital account position.  In other 
words, change in domestic treasury bills demand depends upon the flows of HPM and 
foreign treasury bills.  Central bank profits are equal to the interests on their acquired 
treasury bills. 
The main assumption about private banks is that they are assumed to supply 
loans to households and firms based on their liquidity.  Banks supply loans in the 
interbank markets based on their liquidity and the debtor bank liquidity.  Equations 
5.217 – 5.228 in appendix 5.A show loans supply functions.  These equations state that 
banks are able to supply more loans if their liquidity ratio is above a target ratio set by 
the central bank and they provide less loans if it is lower than the target liquidity 
ratio.  Regarding the interbank markets, banks supply more loans to other banks if 
their liquidity ratio is above the target one and the other bank has a positive change 
in its liquidity ratio. 
Banks acquire vault cash as a portion of money deposits; see equations 5.133 – 
5.136 in appendix 5.A.  The change in banks’ own funds or existing equities is equal to 
the returned earnings after subtracting NPL as shown in equations 5.151 – 5.154 in 
appendix 5.A. 
Banks’ demand for treasury bills is an accounting identity determined in the 
balance sheet of each bank, see equations 5.231 – 5.234 in appendix 5.A.  
The redundant, or the hidden, equation in this model is that the central bank 
in each country supplies vault cash to banks II on demand. 
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The above equation can be derived from equation 5.124 or 5.127. 
5.2.3 MODEL SIMULATIONS 
The baseline scenario assumes that both economies are in a steady state 
condition, i.e. all stocks and flows are constant if all exogenous variables are held 
constant.  If all stocks and flows are constant then as a consequence PSBR equals zero 
then: 
        
      
          
      
        
      
      
      
   
    
 
 
            
      
but            
then  
   
           
      
      
          
  
     
 
From the above equations, the value of steady state real output depends upon 
real government expenditure, government debt servicing, tax rates, and endogenous 
variables.  To know what exactly is going on in the model, we need to use simulations. 
The first scenario (Temporary increase in NPL) 
The first scenario assumes a onetime increase in the households’ non-
performing loans they take from bank I in the first country.  In the baseline scenario it 
is assumed that the ratio of households default loans forms 5.0% of the total loans 
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stock.  In the first scenario this ratio is assumed to increase in period 15 to reach 10.0% 
of total households’ loans from bank I of the first country. 
Credit crunch contagion: 
An increase in non-performing loans leads to an immediate decline in bank I 
income receipts which will affect negatively the bank’s own funds as described in 
equations 5.151 – 5.154.  The decline in bank I own funds affects negatively the bank’s 
demand for government treasury bills, see equations 5.231 – 5.234.  As a consequence, 
bank I liquidity declines, which affects its capability to supply loans to households, 
firms, and in the interbank loans market.  Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the evolution of 
banks I and II of the first and the second country liquidity ratio after the increase in 
the first country bank I NPL. 
Figure 5.3: Evolution of bank liquidity ratio in country one 
 
In the interbank loans market, the decline in bank I liquidity ratio forces the 
bank to decline the supply of interbank loans to the second country bank I.  Bank II in 
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the first country starts to be afraid about bank I solvency, which may affect its 
capability in fulfilling its short and long terms liabilities and thus bank II may be 
affected due to that.  As a consequence, bank II of the first country decreases its 
interbank loans supply to bank I. 
Figure 5.4: Evolution of bank liquidity ratio in country two 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the first country bank I supply of loans to 
bank I of the second country (solid line) and the evolution of the first country bank II 
supply of loans to bank I in the same country (dash line). 
Figure 5.6 shows the interbank loans supply in the second country after the 
increase in bank I NPL of the first country.  The solid line shows the evolution of 
interbank loans supply of bank II of the second country to bank II of the first country.  
The dash line shows the evolution of interbank loans supply of bank II of the second 
country to bank I of the same country. 
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of interbank loans supply in the first country  
 
Figure 5.6: Evolution of interbank loans supply in the second country 
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As shown in the figure, loans supply of bank II of the second country to bank I 
of the first country declines due to the decline in the second country bank I liquidity 
ratio.  The second country bank I liquidity ratio declines due to the decline in the 
received interbank loans from the first country bank I.  As a consequence bank II in 
the second country decreases interbank loans supply to the second country bank I. 
After that bank II of the first country decreases interbank loans supply to bank 
I in the same country, its liquidity ratio increases and due to that interbank loans 
supply to it by the second country bank II increases as shown in figure 5.6. 
Banks in this model aim to keep their liquidity at a target level set by the 
central bank.  And to keep the target level of liquidity, banks change their loans 
supply levels or policies.  When the bank liquidity ratio falls below the target one, 
banks decrease loans supply (credit crunch) and when it rises above the target, banks 
lend more (credit expansion).  In this scenario, decreasing loans supply will lead to an 
increase in bank liquidity and reach levels above the target one and with the increase 
in bank liquidity, they start to lend more.  After a certain period bank liquidity starts 
to decline again and thus lending.  This process will continue until banks find their 
liquidity ratio equal to the target liquidity ratio.  A credit crunch will affect the 
domestic economy as well as the foreign economy through interbank markets in both 
countries. 
Credit crunch effect on the real economy: 
Figure 5.7 shows the evolution of real output in both countries.  It shows that 
the real output declines in both countries immediately after the increase in NPL of 
the first country bank I by households. 
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Figure 5.7: Evolution of real output in both countries 
 
There are two channels through which a credit crunch affects the real 
economy in both countries.  The first is through firms’ investments and the second is 
through households’ consumption.  The decline in bank I of the first country liquidity 
leads to a decline in its lending to households and firms.  The increase in bank II 
liquidity of the same country leads to an increase in its lending to firms and 
households. 
Figure 5.8 shows the evolution of loans supplied by banks I and II to firms and 
households in the first country.  The solid line is the supply of loans to firms by bank 
I, dash line is the supply of loans to firms by bank II, square dots line is the supply of 
loans to households by bank I, and the round dots line is the supply of loans to 
households by bank II. 
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Figure 5.8: Evolution of loans supply in country one 
 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show the evolution of loans supplied by banks I and II in 
the second country to firms and to households.  These figures show that loans supply 
movement follows bank liquidity movement in both countries. 
Figure 5.9: Evolution of loans supply to firms in the second country 
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Figure 5.10: Evolution of loans supply to households in the second country 
 
By equations 5.19 and 5.20, investment depends upon the flows of bank loans 
to firms, and thus credit crunch will affect investment negatively which leads to a 
decline in the real output.  Figure 5.11 shows the evolution of real investment in both 
countries after a one period increase in the first country bank I NPL. 
Figure 5.11: Evolution of real investment in both countries 
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The other channel that affects real output is the households’ consumption.  
There are two effects on households’ consumption, one is direct and the other is 
indirect.  The direct effect can be explained by equations 5.43 and 5.50 in appendix 
5.A.  In this model group 2 households are assumed to ask for loans to cover part of 
their consumption as shown in the equations.  When loans to households decline, 
there consumption will decline too, and thus real output. 
The indirect effect comes from disposable income.  When loans supply to firms 
decline investment declines and also consumption—through the direct effect.  This 
leads to a decline in firms’ sales, which leads to a decline in wages and profits and 
thus disposable income.  Disposable income decline due to the decline in capital 
gains—banks’ own funds—and increase due to the increase in NPL, but these two 
elements will cancel each other, see equations 5.35 – 5.38. 
Figure 5.12 shows the evolution of real households’ consumption in both 
countries after a one period increase in the first country bank I NPL. 
Figure 5.12: Evolution of real households' consumption in both countries 
 
432.2
432.4
432.6
432.8
433
433.2
433.4
433.6
433.8
13 18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
R
e
a
l 
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
Periods
Country 1 Country 2
CHAPTER 5 – CREDIT CRUNCH 
 
149 
 
These declines in investment, consumption, and output in both continues 
continue for several periods then they start to increase again and reach higher levels 
than the steady state levels following banks’ behavior in lending but later it starts to 
decline again towards the steady state levels before the shock.  When there is a credit 
crunch there is a decline in the economy and when there is a credit expansion there is 
an expansion in the economy. 
Regarding the interest rates in the interbank markets and on loans to firms 
and to households, they evolve depending on target bank profits, interest on assets, 
and stocks of loans supplied, see equations 5.155 – 5.158.  When NPL increases, own 
funds declines, so bank liquidity, and thus stocks of loans supplied, which leads to a 
decline in bank profits.  For banks to keep their profits close to the target one, they 
find themselves in need to increase the interest rates on loans supplied.  Figure 5.13 
shows the evolution of interest rates on loans to households and to firms in both 
countries after a one time increase in the first country bank I NPL. 
Figure 5.13: Evolution of loans interest rates in both countries 
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As shown in the figure, bank I in the first country increases loans interest rates 
much more compared with the other banks due to the losses that come from the 
increase in NPL beside the change in the stock of loans supplied.  The other bank 
response is mainly due to the change in the stock of loans supplied to the interbank 
markets and to households and firms.  Interest rates on interbank loans follow the 
same pattern of the interest rates on loans to households and firms; see equations 
5.211 – 5.213. 
The second scenario (Several periods increase in NPL) 
The second scenario assumes an increase in households’ NPL they take from 
bank I for 5 periods starting from period 15.  The reason behind this scenario is to see 
the effect of a several time increase in NPL on the economy, which may allow us to 
generalize the results.  The ratio of NPL as a share of total households demand for 
loans will increase from 5.0% to 10.0%. 
Figure 5.14 shows the evolution of interbank loans supply in both countries 
after the increase in NPL of bank I in the first country (second scenario) compared 
with an increase in the NPL for one time only (first scenario). 
In this figure, one should note that the interbank loan supply is summed for 
both banks in the country not for a specific bank as in figures 5.5 and 5.6 above.  As 
shown in the figure, the effect of a more than one time increase in NPL is more than a 
onetime increase.  The shock has a more negative effect on interbank loans supply in 
the second scenario compared with the first scenario in both countries.  Thus 
interbank lending takes more time to return to its previous levels before the shock in 
the second scenario compared with the first scenario. 
 
CHAPTER 5 – CREDIT CRUNCH 
 
151 
 
Figure 5.14: Evolution of interbank loans supply in both countries 
 
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show the effect of an increase in the NPL of bank I of the 
first country on loans supply to firms and households in both countries in both 
scenarios.  This increase in NPL in the second scenario has a more negative effect on 
loans supply compared with the first scenario in both countries as the case in the 
interbank lending market. 
When NPLs increase in bank I for more than one period bank I starts facing 
losses on its own funds which affects its liquidity and become below the target level 
set by the central bank.  This forces bank I to decrease loans supply in the interbank 
market, to households, and to firms to treasure back its liquidity to be equal to the 
target one.  The continuation of the higher levels of NPLs forces bank I to continue 
decreasing loans supply until its liquidity return back to the target level.  As discussed 
in the first scenario, bank I credit crunch will spread to the other domestic and 
foreign banks. 
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Figure 5.15: Evolution of loans supply to firms in both countries 
 
Figure 5.16: Evolution of loans supply to households in both countries 
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Figure 5.17 shows the real output in both countries in both scenarios.  As 
shown in the figure, the credit crunch in both countries has bigger effects on real 
output in the second scenario compared with the first scenario.  The evolution of real 
output follows the evolution of banking behavior in lending both in the interbank 
lending market and in the domestic market. 
Figure 5.17: Evolution of real output in the first country
10
 
 
Figure 5.18 shows the evolution of real households’ consumption and real 
disposable income in the first country in the case of the second scenario compared 
with the first scenario.  As shown in the figure, real consumption and real disposable 
income are affected in the second scenario more than in the first scenario.  A credit 
                                                          
10
 One should note that due to the different scale between figure 5.7 and 5.17 real output in both 
countries looks identical in figure 5.17 and not in figure 5.7 while real output in the first country is 
slightly higher. 
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crunch in the first country spreads to the other country, which will have a negative 
effect on households’ real consumption and on real disposable income.  Figure 5.19 
shows the evolution of real households’ consumption and real disposable income in 
the second country in both scenarios. 
Figure 5.18: Evolution of real consumption and real disposable income in the first country 
 
Figure 5.19: Evolution of real consumption and real disposable income in the second country 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes the contagion effects of a credit crunch, and its effects 
in a two steady state open economies in a stock flow consistent monetary model.  The 
model deployed in this chapter assumes that a credit crunch happens due to a decline 
in the supply of credit only, with demand for credit following supply.  To see the 
credit crunch contagion, the model is built in such a way to have two types of banks 
in each country.  These banks supply interbank loans to each other in the domestic 
and foreign markets.  This chapter, also, explores the effect of a credit crunch on 
output, investment, consumption, income, and the other main economic variables in 
both countries. 
A credit crunch is assumed to happen due to an increase in households’ non-
performing loans of the first country that they demand from bank I of the same 
country. 
The model simulations show conclusively that credit crunches spread between 
connected banks either locally or globally.  Another result is that highly connected 
banks are affected more than the less connected banks by credit crunch.  In further 
work, it should be possible to quantify the optimal level of connectivity between 
private banks.  
The decline in loans supplied leads to a direct decline in investment of firms 
and in households’ consumption through the decline in new loans they demand to 
cover their investment regarding firms and consumption regarding households. 
The indirect effect on the real economy comes from disposable income. 
Disposable income contains the interests that households do not pay on their non-
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performing loans.  This leads to an increase in disposable income.  But the decline in 
investment leads to a decline in firms’ profits and wages, and thus leads to a decline 
in disposable income. 
Banks are assumed to supply loans based on their liquidity compared to a 
target level set by the central bank.  Any decline in bank liquidity ratios below the 
target level forces banks to diminish their loans, and thus banks change their loans 
supply decision to keep their liquidity close to the target one.  When banks decrease 
their supply of loans their liquidity becomes better-off and they start to increase their 
lending.  Due to this mechanism, the main economic and financial variables continue 
to in a cyclical movement until they return to their previous level before the shock. 
Results of the second scenario show that when the credit crunch continues the 
negative effect on the economy is bigger and it takes more time for the economy to 
return back to previous levels before the shock. 
Several steps can be taken in the future to make this model closer to the 
reality, like introducing two types of households, one owning firms and banks, and 
the others working in those firms and demanding loans.  Another step is to introduce 
more kinds of financial paper that banks purchase and trade among themselves 
locally and globally.  Another step is by introducing demand forces for loans whether 
in the interbank market or in the households and firms sectors.  Finally, one can go 
further in this model to explore the effect of a credit crunch on financial integration 
and globalization. 
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5.4 APPENDIX 5.A: MODEL EQUATIONS 
Production firms equations  
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5.5 APPENDIX 5.B: MODEL CODES 
Before defining the variables, the following notations must take into consideration: 
1- The subscript b refers bank. 
2- The subscript cb refers central bank. 
3- The subscript d refers to demand. 
4- The superscript e refers expected value or volume. 
5- The subscript f = firms. 
6- The subscript h = households. 
7- The superscript or subscript i = I for bank I and II for bank II. 
8- The superscript or subscript j = 1 for country one and 2 for country two. 
9- The subscript l refers loans. 
10- The subscript lb refers to interbank loans. 
11- The subscript m refers deposits. 
12- The superscript T refers target value or volume. 
12- The superscript z = 1 for country one and 2 for country 2, such that z ≠ j. 
 
B Government security (treasury bills) 
BLR
 
Bank liquidity ratio 
C
j 
Nominal consumption 
c
j 
Real consumption 
CAR
 
Capital adequacy ratio 
CG
 
Capital gains 
E1 Exchange rate, how much units of the first country currency per one unit of the first country 
currency. 
F
i j
b Bank profits 
F
i j T 
b Target bank profits 
F
j
cb Central bank profits 
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F
j
f Firms profits 
FDb Bank dividends  
FU
i j
b Bank returned earnings 
FU
i j T
b Target bank returned earnings 
G
j 
Nominal government expenditure 
g
j 
Real government expenditure 
H
j
s High powered money supplied by the central bank 
H
i j
b Vault cash 
H
j
h Households cash money 
I
j 
Nominal investment 
i
j 
Real investment 
K
j 
Nominal fixed capital 
k
j 
Real fixed capital 
L
i j
b i j d Bank i in country j demand for Interbank loans from bank i in country j  
L
i z
b i j d Bank i in country j demand for Interbank loans from bank i in country z 
L
i z
b i j s Bank i in country z supply of Interbank loans to bank i in country j 
L
i j
f Firms loans 
L
i j
h Households loans 
M
i j 
Bank deposits 
N
j 
Number of employees 
N
j
fe Number of employees in a full employment level 
NCAR
i j 
Normal capital adequacy ratio 
NL
j 
Value of new loans 
nl
j 
Real value of new loans 
NPL
i j 
Value of non-performing loans 
npl
i j 
Ratio of NPL as a share of total loans demand 
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npl
i j e 
Expected ratio of NPL as a share of total loans demand 
OF
i j
b Own funds of banks (bank capital) 
OF
i j e
b Expected own funds of banks 
OF
i j T
b Target own funds of banks 
ωT j Real wages 
p
j 
Price index 
φj Price mark-up 
πj Price inflation 
pr
j Workers’ productivity 
PSBR
j 
Public sector borrowing requirement 
r
j
b Treasury bills interest rate 
r
i j
l Loans interest rate 
r
i j
lb Interbank loans interest rate 
r
i j
m Deposits interest rate 
S
j 
Nominal sales 
s
j 
Real sales 
T
j 
Taxes 
T
j
f Firms taxes (sales tax) 
T
j
h Households taxes (income tax) 
UC
j 
Unit cost 
V
j 
Nominal wealth 
V
j
fma Financial market asset wealth 
v
j 
Real wealth 
W
j 
Wage rate 
WB
j 
Wage bill 
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Y
j 
Nominal output or GDP 
y
j 
Real GDP 
YD
j 
Nominal disposable income 
yd
j 
Real disposable income 
yd
j e
 Expected real disposable income 
YP
j 
Value of personal income 
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5.6 APPENDIX 5.C: PARAMETERS VALUES 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
α
1
0 32.5  λ
1
30 0.369586  ξ
I 1
h 100 
α
2
0 32.5  λ
1
31 -0.5  ξ
I 2
h 100 
α
1
1 0.6  λ
1
32 -0.5  ξ
II 1
h 100 
α
2
1 0.6  λ
1
33 1.5  ξ
II 2
h 100 
α
1
2 0.05  λ
1
34 -0.5  ξ
I 1
m 0.0001 
α
2
2 0.05  λ
2
40 0.369586  ξ
I 2
m 0.0001 
β
I 1
b 0.1  λ
2
41 -0.5  ξ
II 1
m 0.0001 
β
I 2
b 0.5  λ
2
42 -0.5  ξ
II 2
m 0.0001 
β
II 1
b 0.1  λ
2
43 -0.5  ζ
I 1
b1 100 
β
II 2
b 0.5  λ
2
44 1.5  ζ
II 1
b1 100 
χ
I 1 
0.233333  λ
I 1
b 0.339056  ζ
II 2
b1 100 
χ
I 2
 0.233333  λ
II 1
b 0.339056  ζ
I 1
b2 100 
χ
II 1
 0.233333  λ
1
c 0.1  ζ
II 1
b2 100 
χ
II 2
 0.233333  λ
2
c 0.1  ζ
II 2
b2 100 
δ
1
k 0.1  Ω
1
0 0.129333    
δ
2
k 0.1  Ω
2
0 0.129333    
ε
1 
0.5  Ω
1
1 0.4    
ε
2
 0.5  Ω
2
1 0.4    
η
1 
1.3  Ω
1
2 0.2    
η
2 
1.1  Ω
2
2 0.2    
λ
1
10 0.237439  Ω
1
3 0.01    
λ
2
10 0.190951  Ω
2
3 0.01    
λ
1
11 1.5   
  0.26    
λ
2
11 1.5             
  0.26    
λ
1
12 -0.5  ρ
I 1 
0.1    
λ
2
12 -0.5  ρ
I 2 
0.1    
λ
1
13 -0.5  ρ
II 1 
0.1    
λ
2
13 -0.5  ρ
II 2 
0.1    
λ
1
14 -0.5  τ
1
s 0.2    
λ
2
14 -0.5  τ
2
s 0.2    
λ
1
20 0.237439  θ
1 
0.15    
λ
2
20 0.283927  θ
2 
0.15    
λ
1
21 -0.5 
 
ξ
I 1
b 0.0005    
λ
2
21 -0.5 
 
ξ
I 2
b 0.0005    
λ
1
22 1.5  ξ
II 1
b 0.0005    
λ
2
22 1.5  ξ
II 2
b 0.0005    
λ
1
23 -0.5  ξ
I 1
f 100    
λ
2
23 -0.5  ξ
I 2
f 100    
λ
1
24 -0.5  ξ
II 1
f 100    
λ
2
24 -0.5  ξ
II 2
f 100    
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5.7 APPENDIX 5.D: EXOGENOUS VARIABLES VALUES 
Variable Value  Variable Value  Variable Value 
B
2
cb 1 d 35.10  N
1
fe 492.22  R
1 
0.00 
B
1
cb 2 d 35.10  N
1
fe 492.22  R
2 
0.00 
BLR
I T 1 
0.20  NCAR
I 1 
0.08  r
1
b 0.03 
BLR
II T 1
 0.20  NCAR
II 1
 0.08  r
2
b 0.03 
BLR
I T 2 
0.20  NCAR
I 2
 0.08  Sh1
1 
0.50 
BLR
II T 2 
 0.20  NCAR
II 2 
 0.08  Sh1
2 
0.50 
bot
I 1 
0.18  npl
I 1
h 0.05  top
I 1 
0.22 
bot
II 1 
0.18  npl
II 1
h 0.05  top
II 1
 0.22 
bot
I 2 
0.18  npl
I 2
h 0.05  top
I 2
 0.22 
bot
II 2 
0.18  npl
II 2
h 0.05  top
II 2
 0.22 
g
1 
161.47  Pr
1 
1.26    
g
2 
161.47  Pr
2 
1.26    
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Chapter 6 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides a tractable accounting scheme, starting from economic 
theory, and implied macro models are derived, emphasizing the dynamic interaction 
between price formation and (functional) income distribution along traditional 
Keynes and Kalecki lines, resulting in aggregate dynamics that could be recognized as 
business cycles. 
Chapter 2 of my thesis provides a literature review on the stock-flow consistent 
approach and its applications.  This chapter starts with the definition of monetary 
economics, the different paradigms in the field of monetary economics, and the 
differences among these paradigms.  After that I introduce the stock flow consistent 
approach, its definition, roots, and features. 
Chapter 3 describes the impact of house price variations on income 
distribution and the business cycle using a stock flow consistent model.  This chapter 
builds on the work done by Zezza (2007) and (2008). 
The model explains a part of the recent financial crisis by modeling the house 
price bubble, which is considered as one of the main contributors of the recent 
financial crisis.  The model shows that the increase in expected house prices leads to 
an increase in most macroeconomic variables, such as output, consumption, 
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investment, and disposable income, but several periods after the incidence of the 
shock, a fall in output and in households’ wealth and income happens. 
Due to the assumption that the shock stays only for several periods, the effect 
of this shock is not going to continue in the long-run, but it will have an effect in the 
short- and medium-runs.  To eliminate the negative effects of this shock, an 
intervention by the government and/ or the central bank is needed to recover the 
economy to levels before the shock.  This chapter conducts three simulation 
experiments (scenarios) in addition to the baseline scenario, which assumes a steady 
state in the economy. 
The first scenario assumes an increase in the expected house prices in the 
economy, the second assumes an increase in pure government expenditure as a fiscal 
policy, and the third assumes that the central bank implements a monetary policy by 
decreasing interest rates on advances supplied to private banks.  These scenarios are 
analyzed to determine what will happen to the economy after the decline.  One can 
try another scenario that assumes both fiscal and monetary policies implemented to 
see the effect on the economy.  It can be easily predicted that both fiscal and 
monetary policies can help the economy better than each policy alone. 
The model shows that the economy experiences a boom at the beginning after 
the increase in house prices.  This boom has a positive effect on the economy, wealth, 
and the distribution of income, but after some periods the economy starts to decline.  
This chapter proposes that an increase in asset prices (real or financial) will have a 
positive effect on the economy in the short-run, but a negative effect in the medium- 
and long-runs if the problem (or the shock) continues.  This chapter shows that fiscal 
and monetary policies are important in stimulating the economy, but more specific 
policies regarding housing and credit markets are also needed to help the economy 
and prevent such shocks from happening in the future. 
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The goal of chapter 4 is to produce a stock flow consistent model to study 
financial integration, as measured by a volume-based measure of international 
financial integration.  The contribution of this chapter is to build a relatively detailed 
model that can explain much about financial integration between countries, as it can 
explore several policies, and agreements, which can be taken in order to enhance 
financial integration, and thus to contribute both to the emerging literature on stock-
flow consistent modeling, as well as the current debate on the costs and benefits of 
ever-closer financial and economic integration amongst the world's economies. 
This chapter shows that freeing trade by eliminating trade barriers leads to 
higher levels of output, income and wealth, and its components for both countries.  
Converging asset prices or rates of return on these assets do lead to a significant 
change in output, income, and wealth, but this converging trend does change the 
households’ portfolio allocation and converge the demand for these assets. 
In this model, monetary union affects the real side of the economy.  The effect 
of monetary union in both real and financial sides of the economy can be more with 
the existing of the proper fiscal and/ or monetary policy accompanied the process of 
monetary union between countries.  Thus, each agreement aimed at promoting 
financial integration between countries should be paralleled with fiscal and monetary 
policies that would stimulate economic growth, income, wealth, and asset prices 
convergence.  Relating this finding back to the European Union's current problems, a 
more developed system of automatic fiscal stabilizers (or a fiscal algorithm or rule set) 
would be beneficial to reduce the effect of asymmetric shocks to individual countries.  
The volume measure of financial integration used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001a and 2007a) does not reflect the effect of converging asset prices on the process 
of financial integration between countries.  This measure can be an appropriate 
182 
 
measure in cases such as a certain agreement or in cases of fiscal policies, but it does 
not reflect the picture in cases such as converging asset prices or returns.  In these 
cases, if one wishes to explore the effect of assets prices or returns convergence, it is 
better to look at the convergence of the demand for foreign assets, as documented 
above.  This model may also be calibrated with real world data to assist policy 
formation. 
Chapter 5 describes credit crunch contagion and its effects in a two country 
stock flow consistent monetary model.  The model deployed in this chapter assumes 
that a credit crunch happens due to a decline in the supply of credit only, and the 
demand for credit follows the supply of it.  To see the credit crunch contagion, the 
model is built in such a way to have two types of banks in each country.  These banks 
supply interbank loans to each other in the domestic and foreign markets.  This 
chapter, also, explores the effect of credit crunch on output, investment, 
consumption, income, and other main economic indicators in both countries. 
The credit crunch is assumed to happen due to an increase in households’ non-
performing loans in the first country, which they demand from bank I of the same 
country. 
Results of the model simulations show conclusively that the credit crunch 
spreads between connected banks either locally or globally.  Another result is that 
highly connected banks are affected more than the less connected banks by the credit 
crunch.  In further work, it should be possible to quantify the optimal level of 
connectivity between private banks.  Given this, one can conclude that the more the 
country is open or economically or financially integrated the more it is vulnerable to 
external shocks. 
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The decline in loans supplied leads to a direct decline in investment of firms 
and in households’ consumption through the decline in new loans they demand to 
cover their investment regarding firms and consumption regarding households. 
The indirect effect on the real economy comes from disposable income. 
Disposable income contains the interests that households do not pay on their non-
performing loans. This leads to an increase in disposable income.  But the decline in 
investment leads to a decline in firms’ profits and wages, and thus leads to a decline 
in disposable income. 
Banks are assumed to supply loans based on their liquidity compared to a 
target level set by the central bank.  Any decline in bank liquidity ratios below the 
target level forces banks to decrease their loans supply to keep their liquidity close to 
the target level.  When banks decrease the supply of loans their liquidity becomes 
better-off and they start to increase their lending.  Due to this mechanism, the main 
economic and financial variables continue in a cyclical movement until they return to 
their previous level before the shock. 
A jump in households’ non-performing loans leads to the same cyclical 
movement as a onetime increase in the non-performing loans in the short-run.  But in 
the long run, due to the positive effect of non-performing loans on disposable income, 
which compensate for the negative effect of the credit crunch on disposable income, 
country one ends up with a slightly higher level of output, consumption, investment, 
and other variables.  In the second country, there is no assumption of an increase in 
non-performing loans, and thus there is no positive effect on disposable income.  As a 
consequence, in the long-run, the main economic variables end up at slightly lower 
levels. 
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Relaxing the assumption that interests of non-performing loans affect 
positively the disposable income, the credit crunch will have a negative effect on the 
economy in the long-run, but the effect is oscillatory in the short-run. 
 
6.2 FUTURE WORK 
Stock-flow consistent monetary models presented in this thesis can provide 
the benchmark for deep analyses of the evolving local and global economies, in which 
different phenomena can be described and analyzed using  comprehensive 
macrodynamic models that can describe the interaction within and between all 
economic sectors in the country.  Stock flow consistent models gather both stocks 
and flows, which is not the case in other models.  The stock flow consistent models 
implemented in this thesis provide a theoretical proof for what is happening these 
days regarding the recent financial crisis. 
Regarding chapter 3, several steps can be taken to expand the model to better 
reflect the real world.   One could expand this model for an open economy, and/ or 
includes two classes of households.  Another dimension is to see the effects of the 
shock on a more complex financial sector than presented here or one can check the 
effect of an increase in households’ debt burdens due to the increase in house prices 
and mortgages, which is not modeled in this chapter. 
Regarding chapter 4, other points and extensions on the model can be taken in 
order to explore financial integration more widely such as assuming that households 
can also purchase foreign equities; firms can also demand loans from foreign banks.  
One can explore financial integration between developing and developed countries.  
Financial integration may also be explored in the case of fixed exchange rates and we 
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could see the effect of financial integration on countries foreign reserves (foreign bills 
in this model). 
Several steps can be taken in the future to make the model of chapter 5 closer 
to reality like, introducing two types of households, one owning firms and banks, and 
the other working in those sectors and demanding loans.  Another step is to 
introduce more kinds of financial papers that banks purchase and trade among 
themselves locally and globally.  Another step would introduce demand forces for 
loans whether in the interbank market or in the households and firms sectors.  
Finally, one can go further in this model to explore the effect of the credit crunch on 
financial integration and globalization. 
My work will proceed in two connected directions: the first is to simulate stock 
flow consistent models using real data, which I think can be a better option for 
economic policy designed for a specific country.  The other direction is to apply stock 
flow consistency for a more complex set of financial assets.  Modern financial systems 
need more complex stock flow consistent models. 
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